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ABSTRACT 
 In the past twenty years, Israel has discovered large deposits of natural gas in the 
exclusive economic zone off its coast. By exploiting these deposits, Israel is rapidly 
becoming not only self-sufficient in natural gas but also a potential exporter of natural 
gas, gaining considerable income. However, Israel faces serious security challenges, both 
from terrorist organizations like Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) 
and from hostile nations like Iran. As the offshore gas platforms become increasingly 
critical for Israel’s economy they also become more appealing targets for Israel’s 
enemies. 
 This thesis addresses the question: How severe are the threats posed by state and 
non-state actors against the physical security of Israeli offshore natural gas platforms? It 
finds that while Hezbollah and Iran are capable of attacking the Israeli offshore 
platforms, they are deterred by Israel’s credible threats and the substantial defense 
systems that protect the platforms and minimize the chances of a successful attack. 
Hamas and PIJ do not yet possess the required capabilities to significantly threaten Israeli 
offshore platforms. Therefore, unless the current geopolitical situation in the area changes 
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Imagine watching live-streaming video of an offshore natural gas platform on fire.
Some workers are fighting the fire against all odds, attempting to delay and maybe 
constrain the destruction, while others are trying to evacuate to safety. Reports are coming 
in about the coast guard and other national authorities mobilizing in order to provide 
assistance and minimize the environmental effects of the disaster. Now think about 
watching these terrible scenes knowing that all this was not the result of an accident but of 
an intentional attack by a terrorist organization or even by another nation’s armed forces. 
In the past twenty years, Israel has discovered large deposits of natural gas (and 
some minor oil deposits) in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) off its coast.1 By 
constructing and operating offshore platforms to exploit these deposits, Israel is rapidly 
becoming not only self-sufficient in natural gas but also a potential exporter of natural gas, 
gaining considerable income. However, Israel is facing serious security challenges, both 
from terrorist organizations, like Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), 
and from hostile nations, like Iran. 
As the offshore gas platforms become increasingly critical for Israel’s economy, 
they also become more appealing targets for its enemies. While some general research on 
offshore platform security is available, the issue of the security of Israeli offshore platforms 
has not yet been investigated. This thesis answers the following question: “How severe are 
the threats posed by state and non-state actors against the physical security of Israeli 
offshore gas platforms?”2 
1 “Exploration History,” State of Israel - Ministry of Energy, accessed November 3, 2019, 
http://www.energy-sea.gov.il/English-Site/Pages/Oil And Gas in Israel/History-of-Oil--Gas-Exploration-
and-Production-in-Israel.aspx. 
2 Israel operates a smaller number of offshore oil platforms, which produce less than 0.1% of its oil 
needs. This thesis will focus on offshore gas platforms due to their significance to Israel’s economy. 
However, most of the threats discussed apply to the offshore oil platforms, too. 
2 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
On September 14, 2019, Iranian-made drones and cruise missiles hit two major oil 
production facilities in Saudi Arabia: the Abqaiq oil processing facility and the Khurais oil 
field complex.3 Regardless of the launching site of this attack—whether it originated in 
Yemen, as the Houthis declared, or in Iran or Iraq as Saudi Arabia and the U.S. claimed—
the attack caused a 5% drop in worldwide oil supply for ten days.4 As a result of the 
physical effects of the attack, as well as the insecurity it created in the global market, the 
crude oil price surged an unprecedented 19.5% the following working day, before closing 
at a 14.6% increase.5 
Attacks on offshore platforms may not be very frequent, or even very successful in 
most cases, but the advance of technology in recent years provides terrorist organizations 
and rogue nations alike with game-changing new weapons and capabilities. The fact that 
the Houthi, a rebel movement in the Yemeni civil war, claim to have conducted a well-
coordinated attack against two targets of strategic importance deep within Saudi Arabia’s 
borders using drones and cruise missiles attests to the feasibility of a terrorist group like 
Hezbollah conducting a similar attack on Israel’s offshore gas  platforms. 
An attack against one or more Israeli offshore gas platforms will not have a severe 
impact on the global market of natural gas. Israel’s production of natural gas in 2017 was 
just 1.3% of the U.S. production, and Israel still had to import 4.6% of its consumed natural 
gas.6 However, such an attack, depending on its success, could cause severe damage to 
Israel’s economy. The production of natural gas would be reduced until it was safe to 
resume drilling operations, natural gas would have to be imported to compensate for the 
 
3 Jeremy Binnie, “Divided Attention: Gulf Air Defenders Struggle to Cover Multiple Directions,” 
Jane’s, October 24, 2019, https://janes-ihs-com.libproxy.nps.edu/Janes/Display/FG_2420455-JDW. 
4 Tsvetana Paraskova, “Saudi Aramco Restores Oil Production Capacity to Pre-Attack Levels,” 
OilPrice.com, September 25, 2019, https://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/Saudi-Aramco-Restores-Oil-
Production-Capacity-To-Pre-Attack-Levels.html. 
5 “Oil Price Explosion – Brent Crude Jumps 20%,” OilPrice.com, accessed November 3, 2019, 
https://oilprice.com/Energy/Oil-Prices/Oil-Price-Explosion-Brent-Crude-Jumps-20.html. 
6 “IEA Energy Atlas,” IEA, accessed November 3, 2019, http://energyatlas.iea.org/#!/tellmap/-
1165808390. 
3 
reduced production, and export clients could decide to look for alternate, more secure, 
sources of natural gas.  
Most importantly, an attack on Israel’s offshore platforms could induce Israel to 
retaliate against the terrorist organization or state that tried to disrupt its natural gas 
production.7 This retaliation would have to be strong enough to destroy the perpetrator’s 
ability to conduct similar attacks in the future and simultaneously deter the perpetrator and 
all other terrorist organizations and states from executing subsequent attacks. Therefore, 
Israel would be forced to engage in military operations that, depending on which 
organization or state conducted or sponsored the attack, might destabilize the area or even 
the entire Middle East, in the event that Iran, beyond any doubt, participated in the 
planning, funding, or execution of the attack. 
In summary, the security of Israel’s offshore gas platforms is critical to its economy. 
Some of Israel’s enemies already have developed or may soon develop the capabilities to 
conduct such attacks. A decision to strike those platforms and the scale of its effect has the 
potential to light the spark that would once more destabilize the entire Middle East. 
Studying the arguably advanced and complex security threats to Israel’s offshore platforms 
and the extensive measures taken to protect them could also provide helpful 
recommendations for other nations which have built or are planning to build offshore 
platforms around the world.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Security of offshore oil and gas installations is a specialized topic that few open 
scholarly sources discuss. In Offshore Oil and Gas Installations Security: An International 
Perspective, arguably the most complete available source on the subject, Mikhail 
Kashubsky recognizes that, while his book covers the general topic of offshore platform 
 
7 “After the Aramco Attack: A Middle East One Step Closer to Its ‘1914 Moment,’” Crisis Group, 
September 20, 2019, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-
peninsula/saudi-arabia/after-aramco-attack-middle-east-one-step-closer-its-1914-moment. 
4 
security, there is a gap in the literature concerning specific regions of the world, including 
Israel.8  
Adequate information about most of the thesis’s component subjects is readily 
available in scholarly, defense or news sources. This thesis uses sources on Israel’s national 
security policy; Hezbollah, Hamas, PIJ and their target-selection policy; Israel’s relations 
to Iran; Israeli defense systems’ capabilities; offshore platform security; and legal issues 
regarding offshore platform defense.  
1. Israeli National Security Policy 
Israel faces significant security challenges. While the chances of a conventional 
war against its Arab neighbors are very low in the present situation, its fight against terrorist 
organizations continues with fluctuating intensity. Hamas and PIJ frequently launch 
rockets from the Gaza Strip against Israeli cities in an everlasting war of attrition. 
Hezbollah may have reduced its attacks against Israel following the 2006 war, but since 
then it has significantly built up its arsenal of rockets and missiles both in quantity and 
quality. Hezbollah is currently focused on supporting the Assad regime in Syria, but its 
leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah has stated that, once this conflict is resolved favorably, 
Israel will become once again the primary target of Hezbollah’s attacks.9 Additionally, 
Iran, a country that refuses to acknowledge the existence of Israel and has publicly 
threatened to annihilate Israel numerous times, is gaining influence in Iraq and Syria and 
actively supports the Assad regime in the Syrian civil war, either through Lebanese and 
Iraqi clients or by deploying Iranian soldiers. 
Israel withdrew from South Lebanon in 2000 and the Gaza Strip in 2005,10 
fulfilling some of the demands motivating Hezbollah, Hamas and PIJ’s terrorist attacks, 
 
8 Mikhail Kashubsky, Offshore Oil and Gas Installations Security: An International Perspective 
(Abingdon, Oxon: Informa Law from Routledge, 2015), 397. 
9 Layla Bassam and Angus McDowall, “Hezbollah’s Nasrallah Says Group to Focus on Israel,” 
Reuters, December 11, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-israel-hezbollah-
idUSKBN1E51OV. 
10 Charles D Freilich, Israeli National Security: A New Strategy for an Era of Change (Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press, 2018), 212–13, https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190602932.001.0001. 
5 
yet the attacks persist. All three organizations still have grievances against Israel: 
Hezbollah considers the Golan Height’s area of Sheba farms as Lebanese and demands that 
Israel cease its occupation,11 while Hamas12 and PIJ13 aim for a Palestinian state in the 
borders of today’s Israel. Hamas appears to be somewhat more open to negotiations with 
Israel than PIJ, hinting that creating a Palestinian state in the 1967 borders (Gaza Strip, 
West Bank, East Jerusalem) could be a temporary acceptable solution.14  
Israel has been gradually taking a more defense-oriented stance against Hezbollah, 
Hamas and PIJ, mostly due to international pressure concerning human rights violations. 
Charles Freilich, in Israeli National Security: A New Strategy for an Era of Change, argues 
that, in regard to Israel’s contest against the Palestinians in general, and Hezbollah and 
Iran, “there is no military solution; there may not be a diplomatic one.”15 The policy of 
Israel against Hezbollah, Hamas, and PIJ has changed from proactive to reactive, trying to 
capitalize on the deterrence established through the wars against Hezbollah in 2006 and 
Hamas in 2014. This period of operational calm has enabled mostly Hezbollah, but also 
Hamas, to replenish and upgrade their rocket and missile inventory, creating a delicate 
balance of deterrence between Israel and Hezbollah and Hamas.16   
Even though the gas deposits are becoming increasingly important to the economic 
growth and the energy autonomy of Israel, the security of the offshore platforms seems to 
be considerably underplayed in the scholarly sources. Freilich, like most other sources, 
does not discuss the subject at all, while former Chief of Staff of the Israeli Defense Forces 
(IDF) Gadi Eisenkot and Colonel (Reserve) Gabi Siboni of the IDF, in Guidelines for 
 
11 B. Schneider, J. Post, and M. Kindt, eds., World’s Most Threatening Terrorist Networks and 
Criminal Gangs (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan Limited, 2009), 136, 
https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230623293. 
12 “Hamas,” Counter Extremism Project, accessed December 5, 2019, 
https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/hamas. 
13 “Palestinian Islamic Jihad,” Counter Extremism Project, accessed December 5, 2019, 
https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/palestinian-islamic-jihad. 
14 Schneider, Post, and Kindt, World’s Most Threatening Terrorist Networks and Criminal Gangs, 
149–50. 
15 Freilich, Israeli National Security: A New Strategy for an Era of Change, 331. 
16 Freilich, 169–70. 
6 
Israel’s National Security Strategy, only make one reference to natural gas installations as 
potential targets of rocket attacks.17 Similarly, no direct quotation of any Israeli official 
threatening retaliation against anyone who will attack Israeli offshore gas platforms is 
publicly available. The closest reference to such a threat came from unnamed Israeli 
officials stating that attacks against Israeli gas platforms, similar to the ones conducted 
against Saudi Arabia, “would prompt a military response.”18 The most probable 
explanation for this lack of information is that the Israelis consider the subject to be 
sensitive and that they keep their own analyses and risk assessments classified. 
2. Methods of Attacks against Offshore Platforms 
In Chapter 4 of his book, Kashubsky identifies methods of attack against offshore 
platforms, categorized according to their purpose (e.g., piracy, terrorism, cyber threats, 
etc.) and their method (e.g., underwater attack, detonation of explosives, etc.).19 In his NPS 
thesis Terrorism in the Maritime Domain, Eng Hock Tng analyzes four potential methods 
of attack: using unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), semi-submersible or submersible 
boats, fast boats, and hijacking a vessel. While the list is somewhat incomplete, the author 
provides some interesting data on cost analysis, as well as technical data on these 
methods.20  
Lorenz, in “Al Qaeda’s Maritime Threat,” analyzes the USS Cole incident and how 
a terrorist organization (Al Qaeda) managed to attack a U.S. destroyer in the Gulf of 
Aden.21 An attack like that could also be used against an offshore platform. 
 
17 Gadi Eisenkot and Gabi Siboni, “Guidelines for Israel’s National Security Strategy” (The 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2019), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-
analysis/view/guidelines-for-israels-national-security-strategy. 
18 Crisis Group, “After the Aramco Attack.” 
19 Kashubsky, Offshore Oil and Gas Installations Security: An International Perspective, 110–50. 
20 Eng Hock Tng, “Terrorism in the Maritime Domain” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
2013), https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/32910. 




3. Hezbollah-Hamas-PIJ: Target Selection Policy 
Lebanese Hezbollah and the Gaza-based Hamas and PIJ are arguably the most 
capable terrorist organizations operating against Israel. Hezbollah, Hamas, and PIJ have 
been operating for a long time, and many scholarly articles and books have been written 
about them. However, no source has yet examined their target-selection policies or 
analyzed the potential for either group to conduct an attack on an offshore platform. As 
this thesis focuses on examining their incentives and capabilities to attack Israel’s offshore 
gas platforms, the thesis explores the capabilities that each organization can use to conduct 
these operations and the necessary relevant training.  
There are many credible sources which provide information on the weapons, 
training and tactics of these terrorist groups, such as Jane’s by IHS Markit and the Counter 
Extremism Project, as well as Frielich. Hezbollah is the more capable, especially since it 
is equipped with Russian and Iranian anti-ship missiles that could be used against offshore 
platforms.22 Hezbollah first displayed its maritime strike capability during a 2006 attack 
with two (or perhaps three) anti-ship missiles against the corvette INS Hanit. Hanit was 
cruising off the coast of Lebanon at the time and was hit by one of the missiles, killing four 
crew members.23 Hamas, on the other hand, allegedly was the first to conduct an 
unsuccessful attack against Israeli offshore platforms by firing two rockets at the platforms 
that are located close to the Gaza Strip, Mari-B or Tamar, in 2014.24  
Even though these organizations have some capability to attack Israeli offshore 
platforms, their incentive to conduct such an attack is so far uncertain. Captain Paul 
Shemella USN (retired), in Global Responses to Maritime Violence, argues that terrorists 
take into consideration the criticality, accessibility, resilience, vulnerability, effects, and 
 
22 “World Insurgency and Terrorism - Hizbullah,” Jane’s, March 12, 2020, 
https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/JWIT0296-JWIT. 
23 Kirk Spencer and Trent Telenko, “An Analysis of the Hezbollah Anti-Ship Missile Strike: The 
Attack on INS Ahi-Hanit,” Israel Resource Review, July 25, 2006, https://israelbehindthenews.com/an-
analysis-of-the-hezbollah-anti-ship-missile-strike-the-attack-on-ins-ahi-hanit/4892/. 




symbolism of each potential target. Given the relatively limited resources of the terrorists, 
they cannot afford to conduct attacks with low possibilities of success. He also states that 
attacks on maritime targets require special skills not commonly available in terrorist groups 
and that coastal maritime surveillance by nations hinder any training before the actual 
attack.25 
Kashubsky dedicates Chapter 4 of his book to analyzing target-selection 
considerations for terrorists. Drake, in Terrorists’ Target Selection, lists the objectives of 
terrorists, which include: threat elimination, compliance, disorientation, attrition, 
provocation, advertisement, and endorsement. He also provides a useful chart for the 
terrorist target selection process.26 
Finally, the Global Terrorism Database provides data for more than 190,000 
recorded terrorist attacks.27 A search for Hezbollah, Hamas, and PIJ attacks generate useful 
information about the preferred methods of attacks and their effectiveness. However, as 
the majority of recent terrorist attacks have been conducted by firing unguided rockets, it 
is impossible to determine a pattern in their target selection policy. One could as well argue 
that their only goal is to just inflict civilian casualties and to disturb social and economic 
activities.  
4. Relations between Israel and Iran 
Iran currently poses the biggest threat to Israeli national security.28 The rivalry 
between Iran and Israel dates to the 1979 Iranian Revolution. A lot of sources on the subject 
are available, but this thesis only examines sources on Iran’s support to Hezbollah, Hamas, 
and PIJ, as well as the capabilities of the Iranian armed forces. Iran’s attack on Saudi 
Arabia’s Abqaiq and Khurais petroleum facilities in September 2019 should provide a 
warning to Israel about Iran’s military capabilities and the possibility of Iran or the other 
 
25 Paul Shemella, ed., Global Responses to Maritime Violence: Cooperation and Collective Action 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, an imprint of Stanford University Press, 2016). 
26 C. J. M Drake, Terrorists’ Target Selection (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan Limited, 1998). 
27 “GTD | Global Terrorism Database,” Global Terrorism Database, accessed November 4, 2019, 
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/. 
28 Freilich, Israeli National Security: A New Strategy for an Era of Change, 334. 
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terrorist organizations conducting such an attack against Israel29; no matter who launched 
the attack, there is no doubt that the drones and missiles were Iranian and that the operators 
were trained by Iranians. 
Ostovar argues that if the Assad regime remains in power after the end of the Syrian 
civil war, Iran will again be able to support Hezbollah more easily, providing more accurate 
rockets and missiles with lower risk. It will also be able to directly attack Israel.30 The 
improvement of the rocket and missile capabilities of Iran, concerning both range and 
accuracy, are described by Frielich31 and are also available at Jane’s IHS Markit. Few 
sources examine the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)’s maritime capabilities 
in detail, including their tactics and training. These capabilities were recently displayed in 
the capturing of a British tanker in the Strait of Hormuz in July 2019.32 IRGC assets could 
be used either to train Hezbollah terrorists or they could conduct an attack against Israeli 
offshore platforms using manned or unmanned fast boats or helicopters, operating from 
Syria or Lebanon or merchant vessels in the proximity of the targeted platforms.  
5. Israel’s Resources for Defending Offshore Platforms 
There are few scholarly sources on Israel’s defenses against terrorist attacks on 
offshore platforms. Freilich reports on the performance of the Iron Dome system, which is 
used to intercept and destroy incoming rockets or missiles. A naval variant of Iron Dome, 
called C-Dome, has been developed and is being installed on Saar 5 corvettes. C-Dome 
will also equip the new class of Saar 6 corvettes. These four ships were bought from 
Germany to defend the offshore platforms of Israel against potential attacks.33 
 
29 Yoel Guzansky, Eldad Shavit, and Sima Shine, “The Attack on the Saudi Oil Facilities: A New 
Level of Iranian Audacity,” The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), accessed October 30, 2019, 
https://www.inss.org.il/publication/the-attack-on-the-saudi-oil-facilities-a-new-level-of-iranian-audacity/. 
30 Afshon Ostovar, “The Grand Strategy of Militant Clients: Iran’s Way of War,” Security Studies 28, 
no. 1 (2019): 24, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2018.1508862. 
31 Freilich, Israeli National Security: A New Strategy for an Era of Change, 73–79. 
32 “Iranian Revolutionary Guard Video Shows Moment Forces Boarded a British Tanker,” The Wall 
Street Journal, July 20, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/video/iranian-revolutionary-guard-video-shows-
capture-of-british-tanker/6CEEC80D-0CFF-4FB7-A73F-23A6656A4D30.html. 
33 Yaakov Lappin, “Iron Dome Goes Naval to Defend Gas Rigs,” Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic 
Studies, December 20, 2017, https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/naval-iron-dome/. 
10 
Jane’s IHS Markit is a credible source of military hardware information, as well as 
news reports from well-known Israeli and international websites.  
Understandably, there are no open sources on other defenses of offshore platforms 
in general, like defenses against drones, security details and armament on board the 
platforms, patrols of manned and unmanned surface and aerial vessels etc. 
6. Legal Limitations on Defending Offshore Platforms 
Kashubsky34 and Assaf Harel35 extensively analyze the legal restrictions on 
defending offshore platforms from terrorist attacks. Kashubsky, in particular, spend over 
150 pages of his book explaining the legal status of offshore platforms. Both writers come 
to the same conclusions: most notably, if an offshore platform is located outside the 
nation’s territorial sea (in international waters), the coastal state can only declare a safety 
zone of 500 meters around the platform. This zone is deemed as completely insufficient 
for protection against modern threats, due to the speed of the vessels or planes and the 
range of missiles that could be used against them. Coastal states, however, can establish 
larger identification zones, in which ships are requested, but not technically obligated, to 
provide information to the coastal state.  
Both writers investigate and debate methods to enlarge the safety zone, only to 
determine that a coastal nation does not have the legal right to do so. The only way to 
prevent an actual attack from happening is to declare self-defense against the vessel or 
aircraft which is about to conduct an attack, thus posing an imminent threat to the safety of 
the platform. However, even this method has many limitations, like the obligation to limit 
the force used for self-defense to a level proportional to the threat and to be able to prove 
the intent and the imminence of the attack by the vessel or aircraft. 
In reality, coastal nations regularly declare safety zones larger than 500 meters or 
they purposely do not specify the breadth. Israel has proven in the past that it can operate 
in legally “grey areas,” when it imposed a naval blockade to the Gaza Strip in 2007. The 
 
34 Kashubsky, Offshore Oil and Gas Installations Security: An International Perspective. 
35 Assaf Harel, “Preventing Terrorist Attacks on Offshore Platforms: Do States Have Sufficient Legal 
Tools,” Harvard Law School National Security Journal 4 (2012): 131. 
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blockade was judged illegal by a panel of UN human rights experts,36 but Israel still 
enforces the blockade.  
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
In order to evaluate the probability of non-state or state actors attacking Israel’s 
offshore platforms, this thesis investigates the following four factors: first, Israel’s own 
perception of this threat; second, the defensive measures it has taken to counter it; third, 
Israel’s policy of deterrence against attacks; and, fourth, the capabilities and incentives of 
Hezbollah, Hamas, PIJ, and Iran to conduct attacks against Israel’s offshore platforms. 
Based on these factors, the thesis evaluates whether the likelihood of an attack on Israel’s 
offshore platforms is high or low. In order for the likelihood to be high, the potential 
aggressors must have both the capabilities and the will to conduct such attacks, overcoming 
any thoughts of possible failure, public outcry, and, more important, Israeli reaction. In 
contrast, the likelihood of attacks against Israel’s offshore platforms will be low if the 
potential aggressors either lack the necessary capabilities or if Israel successfully deters 
them from attacking by threatening to retaliate in much greater force.  
Regarding Israel’s perception of the threat, Israel seems to consider the security 
threat to its offshore platforms severe enough to take extensive measures to protect them. 
More specifically, Israel ordered four new Magen class (Saar 6) corvettes from Germany 
in 2015 to shield the offshore platforms from potential missile and rocket threats. These 
ships will be equipped with a naval variant of the very successful Iron Dome air defense 
system, as well as modern Barak 8 air defense missiles.37  At the same time, Israel is 
upgrading existing missiles onboard its other warships and procuring patrol boats, 
unmanned surface and aerial vehicles, and other systems to improve its maritime situation 
awareness (MSA) capability in the area and to further bolster the defense of the 
 
36 Stephanie Nebehay, “U.N. Experts Say Israel’s Blockade of Gaza Illegal,” Reuters, September 13, 
2011, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-gaza-rights-idUSTRE78C59R20110913. 
37 Judah Ari Gross, “With High-Tech Warships, Navy Readies to Guard Gas Fields from Hezbollah, 
Hamas,” Times of Israel, February 5, 2018, https://www.timesofisrael.com/with-high-tech-warships-navy-
readies-to-guard-gas-fields-from-hezbollah-hamas/. 
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platforms.38 Therefore, even in the absence of relevant public reports from official or 
scholarly sources, Israel is clearly aware of credible and severe threats against its offshore 
platforms and is taking measurable actions to counter them. 
The fact that there have been no successful attacks against Israel’s offshore gas 
platforms yet does not, in any way, indicate that Hezbollah, Hamas, PIJ, and, even more 
seriously, Iran, do not possess the necessary resources to conduct such attacks. Hamas 
seems to have already failed at an attack,39 while Hezbollah demonstrated the required 
capabilities in the 2006 missile attack against the INS Hanit.40 Iran, as a state, has more 
advanced resources and capabilities to threaten the security of the offshore platforms. It 
could launch an attack similar to the one against Saudi Arabia’s oil facilities in September 
2019, from Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, or even Iran, or try different methods of attack, like a 
special forces assault. 
A final factor that will affect the thesis’s threat evaluation, is assessing why Israel’s 
enemies refrain from attacking its offshore platforms. Potential explanations could be that 
they are deterred by the expected heavy retaliation by Israel, they choose to focus their 
attacks on other targets, they believe the attack’s chances of success are low, they are 
engaged in other operations (e.g., Hezbollah in Syria), they believe that the public will 
blame them for the negative effects of the attack (environmental or economic), or they are 
still engaged in organizing and preparing for the attacks. All these explanations will be 
discussed and assessments of their overall impact on the decision-making process will be 
provided.  
That said, the level of threat to Israel’s offshore platforms is not constant. The 
capabilities of all the actors, Israel and potential attackers alike, are continuously evolving 
with the introduction of new weapon systems and tactics. At the same time, the incentives 
and the willingness of Hezbollah, Hamas, PIJ, and Iran to conduct an attack against Israel’s 
 
38 Ari Rabinovitch, “Israel Bolsters Navy to Protect Offshore Oil and Gas Zone,” Reuters, January 19, 
2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-natgas-navy-idUSKBN1531CB. 
39 Henderson, “Rocket Fire on Israeli Gas Platforms Could Escalate Gaza Fighting.” 
40 Spencer and Telenko, “An Analysis of the Hezbollah Anti-Ship Missile Strike: The Attack on INS 
Ahi-Hanit.” 
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offshore platforms are changing as a result of international and domestic politics. The thesis 
concludes that, if the status quo remains intact, it is unlikely that attacks will occur. A 
radical change in either the deterrence level of Israel (e.g., due to a prolonged period of 
political instability) or the policy of the aggressors (e.g., due to the emergence of a new, 
even more radical leader, or due to severe external pressures to that group that could force 
them to risk such attacks) could substantially increase the possibility of attacks against 
Israel’s offshore platforms. 
In summary, it appears that Israel itself acts in a way that indicates it perceives the 
threats against its offshore platforms to be present and severe, and Israel’s enemies have 
the capabilities to conduct attacks against Israel’s offshore platforms should they so choose.  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
To test the hypotheses, this thesis uses a single case study of Israeli offshore 
platforms’ security. I conducted the research for this case study by, first, assessing the 
offshore gas platforms’ vulnerabilities, both due to their construction characteristics and 
their location in the Israeli EEZ. I then examined the offensive capabilities of the 
prospective attackers in comparison to the defensive capabilities of Israel. The goal was to 
assess the following: 
• The gas platforms’ vulnerabilities and the way attackers could exploit 
them to damage the offshore platforms.  
• The potential attackers’ offensive capabilities regarding attacking offshore 
platforms and Israel’s respective defensive capabilities. 
• The factors that potential attackers would likely consider (criticality, 
accessibility, resilience, vulnerability, effects, and symbolism) in order to 
decide whether to select Israel’s offshore platforms as targets and their 
estimation of expected benefits and costs for conducting such an attack. 
• The target-selection policy of Hezbollah, Hamas, PIJ, and Iran.  
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• Based on the above, the probability of non-state and state actors attacking 
Israeli offshore gas platforms. 
As noted in the literature review, no experts have yet examined the thesis topic. 
However, I draw from available scholarly articles and books about discrete topics that help 
me investigate and answer the research question. These topics include: Israel’s natural gas 
deposits, which highlight the importance of offshore gas platforms to the Israeli economy; 
offshore platform security and legal limitations to their defense, which reveal the 
vulnerabilities of the offshore platforms and the difficulties of defending them against 
attacks; Hezbollah’s, Hamas’s, PIJ’s, and Iran’s disputes with Israel, which reveal the 
incentives for these actors to attack the platforms; and Israel’s deterrence policy, which 
shows how Israel tries to convince these actors that attacking its critical infrastructure is to 
their disadvantage. Datasets on terrorist attacks were used to investigate patterns of past 
attacks on offshore platforms anywhere in the world and past attacks of Hezbollah, Hamas, 
PIJ, and Iran on other targets. This information, in conjunction with scholarly sources on 
terrorist groups’ target-selection policy in general, helped in assessing why these actors 
have not attacked Israel’s offshore platforms yet and whether attacks are likely to occur in 
the future. As the whole issue of Israel’s natural gas exploration and exploitation is 
relatively new and still in progress, news articles from credible sources were also used. 
Finally, information on weapons systems and their capabilities were obtained from 
specialized defense websites, like Jane’s by IHS Markit. 
Additionally, I researched information about Israeli Navy procurement programs 
after the discovery of the natural gas deposits and determined that there is currently a naval 
build-up related to the need for protecting the offshore platforms. I also researched 
information about the strike capabilities of Hezbollah, Hamas, PIJ, and Iran. Finally, news 
reports and statements by all involved leaders were analyzed to understand the policy of 
each actor.  
A limitation of the thesis is that I did not use sources written in Arab, Hebrew, or 
Farsi, limiting the sources I used to those written in English, which could be biased in favor 
of Israel. Every effort was made to use the most credible available sources. In case of any 
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doubt about the source’s reliability, I made a specific reference in the text and provided my 
own assessment of the information. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis examines all aspects of offshore gas platform security off the coast of 
Israel, providing for the first time a detailed open-source analysis of this topic for the 
region. Chapter II examines Israel’s natural gas deposits and the impact of natural gas 
exploitation on Israel. Chapter III highlights the vulnerabilities of the offshore gas 
platforms in general, examining the inherent risks of operating these platforms, the types 
of security threats and the methods that potential attackers can use to attack them. Chapter 
IV identifies the non-state and state actors who have incentives to conduct such attacks in 
Israel and analyzes their capabilities. Chapter V examines how Israel perceives the threats 
against its offshore platforms and the measures it takes to protect them. The final chapter 
offers the answer to the research question, conclusions, and recommendations. 
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II. EFFECTS OF NATURAL GAS DISCOVERIES ON ISRAEL 
The discovery of large deposits of natural gas in the Israeli exclusive economic 
zone (EEZ) has been the driving force for various positive developments for Israel in the 
economic, geopolitical, and environmental sectors. The impact on the economy is the most 
obvious and positive, contributing to the continuous growth of Israel’s gross domestic 
product (GDP). Importantly, since Israel has quickly transformed its electricity sector to 
utilize natural gas instead of coal or oil, the country is gradually becoming energy 
independent. Geopolitically, Israel is becoming a player in the regional energy market and 
has strengthened its diplomatic relations with Cyprus, Egypt, and Greece. The 
environmental impact of using natural gas instead of other fossil fuels is also significant, 
substantially reducing the emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2). However, natural gas 
exploitation by Israel faces challenges. Finding long-term export customers has proven to 
be a complicated endeavor, which could result in actual exports (and profits) being less 
than anticipated, while air and sea pollution from the production platform activities, or 
because of an accident or terrorist attack, could have devastating consequences for the 
environment, the tourism industry, and public health.  
The benefits that Israel gains from the production of natural gas from the deposits 
off its coast are so significant that the government classifies the offshore gas platforms as 
critical infrastructure and, therefore, alluring targets for non-state or state actors to attack.  
A. NATURAL GAS DISCOVERIES AND DEPOSITS 
Before 2004, the year when Israel started producing its own natural gas, Israel 
imported more than 99% of the fossil fuels it needed for its economy.41 Israel’s power 
plants ran on coal or oil, and industries and transportation were dependent mostly on oil. 
Since the country does not produce coal and its production of oil is less than 1% of 
 
41 Sujata Ashwarya, Israel’s Mediterranean Gas: Domestic Governance, Economic Impact, and 
Strategic Implications (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2019), 1. 
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consumption,42 Israel depended heavily on imports from other countries. Additionally, a 
critical feature of Israel’s power grid is that it lacks a connection to the power grid of any 
other nation, so it cannot import electrical power. This renders Israel an “electricity 
island.”43 If it fails to secure fuel for its power plants, its power grid will go dark. As long 
as this needed fuel is imported, the ability to secure it without interruptions constitutes a 
huge national security concern. 
Since 1999, several natural gas deposits have been discovered under the seabed of 
the eastern Mediterranean Sea and inside Israel’s EEZ, the exploitation of which has 
reduced the state’s dependence on imports. The first significant natural gas discovery came 
in 1999 with the Noa deposit. This deposit was not large, only 1.3 billion cubic meters 
(bcm), but it was the first indication of the existence of natural gas deposits in the area. A 
second, much larger discovery followed in 2000. Mari-B, close to Noa, had estimated 
reserves of 45 bcm and was the first deposit to be exploited.44 The start of natural gas 
production from Mari-B in 2004 marked the beginning of a long process to transform 
Israel’s energy sector in order to use the domestically produced natural gas as fuel instead 
of imported coal or oil. After these initial two discoveries, further deposits were discovered. 
In 2009, the Tamar and Dalit natural gas deposits were discovered. The Tamar deposit was 
the largest yet, with estimated natural gas reserves of 240 bcm, while Dalit was much 
smaller (8 bcm). The next year brought the discovery of Leviathan, a huge deposit of 
approximately 500 bcm of natural gas. Leviathan was the largest discovery of natural gas 
in the world in the first decade of the twenty-first century.45 Additional deposits were 
 
42 “Petroleum and Other Liquids Annual (Israel),” U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), 




43 “Characteristics of the Electricity Sector in Israel,” Israel Electric (IEC), accessed March 19, 2020, 
https://www.iec.co.il/en/aboutus/pages/characteristics.aspx. 
44 State of Israel - Ministry of Energy, “Exploration History.” 
45 State of Israel - Ministry of Energy, “Exploration History.” 
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discovered in 2012 and 2013: Karish (51 bcm) and Tanin (34 bcm),46 Shimshon (15.6 
bcm),47 and Aphrodita-Ishai (7–10 bcm).48 Figure 1 shows a map of all deposits. 
 
Figure 1. Natural gas deposits in and around Israel’s EEZ49 
The total estimated recoverable natural gas reserves for all the deposits amounts to 
900 bcm,50 which can meet Israel’s domestic demand for natural gas for many decades. 
 
46 “East Med E&P: Our Assets,” Delek Group, accessed March 19, 2020, https://www.delek-
group.com/our-operations/east-med/. 
47 “Israel’s Shimshon Reservoir Estimated to Have 550 Bcf of Natgas,” Reuters, October 2, 2012, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/shimshon-natgas-idUSL6E8L2B5C20121002. 
48 Ari Rabinovitch and Michele Kambas, “Cyprus, Israel Seek Gas-Sharing Formula to Unlock East 
Med Energy Hub,” Reuters, May 7, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-cyprus-aphrodite-
idUSKBN1I80UQ. 
49 Source: State of Israel - Ministry of Energy, “Exploration History.” 
50 State of Israel - Ministry of Energy, “Exploration History.” 
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Israel’s natural gas consumption in 2017 was 10 bcm51 and will continue to increase in the 
following years, as the goal of the Israeli Ministry of Energy is to eliminate the use of coal 
in the power plants by 2030.52 Current projections by the ministry are for natural gas 
consumption to reach 18–19 bcm by 2030. Even with this increased consumption, it is 
estimated that by 2042 only half the current reserves (450 out of 900 bcm) will have been 
consumed by domestic use of natural gas.53 Therefore, it is clear that Israel can export 
large quantities of natural gas without worrying that its natural gas reserves will be depleted 
in the near future. 
Even if Israel appears to have an abundance of natural gas, it can by no means be 
considered a major natural gas producer that can affect the global natural gas market, nor 
is the country likely to become one in the future. In 2017, Israel ranked as the 42nd largest 
producer of natural gas, producing 78 times less natural gas than the U.S. (the world’s 
leading producer).54 Israel’s production has almost doubled since Leviathan began 
production in January 2020, but it is still ranked below 30th. Israel also ranked 41st in natural 
gas reserves in 2019, with the leading nation, Russia, having 272 times more natural gas in 
reserves.55  
 
51 “Natural Gas Annual Production and Consumption (Israel),” U.S. Energy Information 




52 “Energy Economy Objectives for the Year 2030,” (executive summary, State of Israel - Ministry of 
Energy, October 2018), http://www.energy-sea.gov.il/English-
Site/Pages/Regulation/energy_economy_objectives_2030.pdf. 
53 “Domestic Demand,” State of Israel - Ministry of Energy, accessed March 19, 2020, 
http://www.energy-sea.gov.il/English-Site/Pages/Gas%20Markets/Natural-Gas-Domestic-Demand-.aspx. 
54 “Dry Natural Gas Production 2017,” U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), accessed 
March 19, 2020, 
https://www.eia.gov/international/rankings/world?pa=10&u=0&f=A&v=none&y=01%2F01%2F2017&ev=
false. 





B. LOCATION OF PRODUCTION WELLS, PRODUCTION PLATFORMS, 
AND LAYOUT OF NATURAL GAS UPSTREAM 
In March 2020, only the two largest natural gas deposits were being used for 
production: Tamar and Leviathan (see Figure 2 for the location of the offshore production 
platforms). Mari-B and Noa are depleted,56 after being fully exploited, while production 
from Karish is scheduled to commence in 2021.57 The exploitation of the other deposits 
(Tanin, Dalit, Dolphin, Aphrodita-Ishai, Shimshon, and Alon D) is currently on hold. This 
section presents a short description of the production process of Tamar, Leviathan, and 
Karish, in order to highlight redundancies and deficiencies. 
 
Figure 2. Location of Leviathan and Tamar production platforms58 
 
56 Henderson, “Rocket Fire on Israeli Gas Platforms Could Escalate Gaza Fighting.” 
57 “Karish Main Wells Offshore Israel in Completion Phase,” Offshore, January 29, 2020, 
https://www.offshore-mag.com/field-development/article/14092722/karish-main-wells-offshore-israel-in-
completion-phase. 




The Tamar deposit lies approximately 90 kilometers (48.6 nautical miles) west of 
Haifa (Figure 3). Its six production wells are subsea,59 meaning completely submerged, at 
depths between 1648 and 1704 meters.60 The produced natural gas is transported through 
two 150 kilometer- (81 nautical mile-) long underwater pipelines to the Tamar Production 
Platform, which is located 25 kilometers (13.5 nautical miles) west of Ashkelon. The 
production platform was intended to be located closer to Haifa, but opposition from 
residents led to the expensive solution of placing the production platform close to the 
existing Mari-B platform.61 The natural gas is processed at the platform, which can 
produce approximately 12.4 bcm annually,62 and then transported through an underwater 
pipeline to an onshore terminal in Ashdod, where some final processing is being performed. 
Finally, the natural gas is pumped into the national pipelines to be transported to domestic 
consumers or to be exported. 
 
59 Delek Group, “East Med E&P.” 
60 “Geoscience Data Sources,” State of Israel - Ministry of Energy, accessed March 19, 2020, 
http://www.energy-sea.gov.il/English-Site/Pages/Data%20and%20Maps/Data-sources.aspx. 
61 “Tamar Gas Field,” Delek Drilling, accessed March 10, 2020, 
https://www.delekdrilling.com/natural-gas/gas-fields/tamar; Amiram Barkat, “Tamar Gas through Ashdod 
Gets Tentative Approval,” Globes, August 9, 2010, https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-1000580690. 
62 “Tamar Natural Gas Field,” Offshore Technology | Oil and Gas News and Market Analysis, 
accessed March 20, 2020, https://www.offshore-technology.com/projects/tamar-field/. 
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Figure 3. Tamar production wells and production platform63 
2. Leviathan 
The Leviathan deposit is located 130 kilometers (70.2 nautical miles) west of Haifa. 
Its layout is similar to Tamar. It has four undersea production wells, at depths between 
1667 and 1710 meters.64 Two underwater pipelines transport the natural gas to the 
Leviathan Production Platform, which is located just 10 kilometers (6 nautical miles) west 
of Dor. At the platform, which has a capability to produce 12 bcm of natural gas annually, 
the natural gas is fully processed and then transported through an underwater pipeline 
directly to the onshore national pipelines for consumption or export. 
3. Karish 
The natural gas deposit Karish is located 25 kilometers (13.5 nautical miles) 
northeast of the Tamar deposit, in water depths of over 1700 meters. The three subsea 
production wells will be connected to a Floating Production Storage Offloading (FPSO) 
vessel, which will be positioned above the wells. The FPSO vessel will be able to produce 
 
63 Source: Delek Group, “East Med E&P.” 
64 State of Israel – Ministry of Energy, “Geoscience Data Sources.” 
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8 bcm of natural gas per year. The gas will then be transported through underwater 
pipelines to the shore close to Dor (Figure 4 shows a field schematic).65 
 
Figure 4. Karish production wells and FPSO vessel66 
The current setting of Israel’s natural gas production offers some redundancy, 
which is expected to gradually increase as exploitation of new deposits begins or existing 
fields and production platforms are upgraded. The current annual production of natural gas 
by Tamar and Leviathan, which is 24.4 bcm (more than double the domestic consumption 
for 2017, which was 10 bcm), provides some redundancy in case one of the production 
platforms fails to deliver natural gas to its consumers. Both platforms produce enough 
natural gas to meet the domestic demands. When Karish starts production in 2021, the 
overall production will be increased to 32.4 bcm per year and a third completely different 
network of pipelines will connect to the national grid, providing even more redundancy to 
 
65 “Karish | Energean Oil & Gas PLC,” Energean, accessed March 19, 2020, 
https://www.energean.com/operations/israel/karish/. 
66 Source: Energean, “Karish | Energean Oil & Gas PLC.” 
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the network. There are also options to increase the production of Tamar to 20.4 bcm67 and 
Leviathan to 21 bcm,68 which if completed, will further increase the overall production to 
49.4 bcm per year. Another method to introduce natural gas to the national natural gas grid 
is through the Hadera LNG terminal, which was mostly used from 2012 to 2013 to import 
natural gas via LNG vessels. The buoy system is still available 10 kilometers (6 nautical 
miles) west of Hadera, and 2.5 bcm of natural gas could be imported annually if required.69 
C. EFFECTS OF THE EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL GAS DISCOVERIES 
IN ISRAEL 
The exploitation of the large natural gas deposits which were discovered off Israel’s 
coast provides important benefits to the state, some more apparent than others. This section 
lists these economic, geopolitical, and environmental benefits and offers a brief description 
of each one, starting with the most obvious and undisputable, then proceeding to the more 
ambiguous benefits, before finally adding some costs and risks that the exploitation of 
natural gas entails.  
1. Certain Benefits 
a. Economic 
Israel has already saved large amounts of hard currency by reducing coal and oil 
imports. According to Israel’s Ministry of Energy, the direct financial benefit from the use 
of indigenously produced natural gas for 2004–17 is 50 billion NIS (New Israeli 
Sheqels).70 Most of the savings (76%) resulted from changes in the fuel that power plants 
use. The remaining savings were in the industrial sector.71 As previously mentioned, 
 
67 Delek Drilling, “Tamar Gas Field.” 
68 “Leviathan Gas Field,” Delek Drilling, accessed March 20, 2020, 
https://www.delekdrilling.com/natural-gas/gas-fields/leviathan. 
69 “Excelerate Energy – Hadera Deepwater LNG Terminal,” Excelerate Energy, accessed March 20, 
2020, https://excelerateenergy.com/project/hadera-deepwater-lng-terminal/. 
70 The exchange rate between NIS and U.S. dollars (USD) fluctuated between 0.22 and 0.31 during 
this period. To get a rough estimate, with an arbitrary average rate of 0.26, 50 billion NIS equals to USD 13 
billion. 
71 Ashwarya, Israel’s Mediterranean Gas: Domestic Governance, Economic Impact, and Strategic 
Implications, 13. 
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Israel’s energy sector depended on imported coal and oil. Natural gas is progressively 
replacing these imported fuels. In 2017, natural gas accounted for the production of 63.2% 
of Israel’s electricity (Figure 5).72 The imports of coal have been constantly diminishing 
since 2012; in 2017, Israel imported 39% less coal than in 2012.73 
 
Figure 5. Power generation in Israel by fuel type (2017)74 
Another important benefit for Israel’s economy is the reduction of the price of 
electricity due to the replacement of imported coal by natural gas as fuel for its power 
plants. An example of this price reduction occurred in February 2015, when electricity 
prices were reduced by 12%.75 This reduction was only made possible after the power 
plants started using natural gas from the Tamar deposit, reducing, therefore, the cost of 
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electricity production. With cheaper electricity, Israeli industries lower their production 
costs, therefore increasing the competitiveness of their products in the global market. For 
households, the reduction of electricity prices results in more money to either save or spend 
in the local economy. The connection of households to the natural-gas grid would also 
provide further benefits to the economy by decreasing household costs (i.e., heating, 
laundry, cooking) and oil imports. In 2017, a pilot program to connect the Dimona 
neighborhood in southern Israel (1,400 houses) was initiated,76 but no further expansions 
have been announced. 
Importantly, Israel has established a sovereign wealth fund (SWF) to accumulate 
and invest the profits of all sales of natural resources, including natural gas, oil, and 
minerals. The fund, which will be managed by a division of the Bank of Israel,77 is 
expected to receive some 250 billion NIS (approximately USD 69.3 billion) over the next 
thirty years.78 This SWF will become active (i.e., investments will commence) when its 
deposits reach USD 1 billion, probably in 202079 or 2021.80 
b. Geopolitical 
The most important benefit that Israel receives by the exploitation of its natural gas 
resources is its increasing energy security. Israel’s energy sector is rapidly transforming in 
order to depend almost exclusively on natural gas and renewable sources. Its goal is to use 
renewable energy for 10% by 2020 and 17% by 2030,81 and fully replace the imported 
coal and oil as fuel for its power plants. The goal of the Israeli Ministry of Energy for 2030 
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is to achieve 95% use of natural gas in the industrial sector for the production of energy 
and steam. By 2030, import of vehicles that run on fossil fuels is planned to be banned, 
paving the way for electrical cars and natural gas trucks and buses.82 Israel is gradually 
becoming, therefore, energy independent. This removes the danger of Israel being unable 
to secure the required fuel for its power plants because of sanctions imposed by any coal 
or oil exporting country, or international organization, like the United Nations. However, 
this danger might be somewhat overstated, as Israel imports coal from Colombia, Russia, 
South Africa, and other countries,83 while oil is imported mostly from Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, and Russia.84 As coal and oil imports are transported to Israel by sea, even if 
many of these states cease exporting to Israel at the same time, Israel could seek to import 
from other producers. Only a global embargo could have a significant impact on Israel’s 
energy security.  
c. Environmental 
The replacement of coal by natural gas has very positive effects on the environment. 
Natural gas power plants emit less carbon dioxide (CO2) to the atmosphere than the ones 
run on coal. As more natural gas-fired power plants became available, Israel reduced its 
CO2 emissions per capita from 2007–16 by 16%.85 This decrease is of course the result of 
all environmental policies that Israel implemented during that time, but it is certain that the 
replacement of coal by natural gas had a significant impact. According to Noble Energy, a 
partner company of Tamar and Leviathan gas fields, the use of natural gas reduces CO2 
emissions by 350 million tons. In comparison, this amount of emissions equals the 
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cumulative twenty-five-year CO2 emissions by all cars in Israel.86 The expansion of the 
use of natural gas to industries and transportation in Israel is going to offer further benefits 
to the environment.  
2. Uncertain Benefits 
a. Economic 
Exporting natural gas is a certain benefit, which one can argue should be listed in 
the previous section of benefits. However, the shifting geopolitical and energy environment 
of the Eastern Mediterranean complicates Israel’s effort to secure export customers for its 
natural gas and creates reasonable doubts about whether the natural gas exports will meet 
Israeli expectations. Therefore, the benefits of exporting Israel’s natural gas are not to be 
taken for granted. 
The Leviathan and Tamar partners have already signed export deals with Jordan 
and Egypt to export natural gas from the Tamar and Leviathan natural gas fields. A contract 
was signed in 2016 between the Leviathan partners and the Jordanian natural gas company 
NEPCO for the supply of approximately 45 bcm of natural gas over a period of fifteen 
years from the Leviathan deposit. The deal was worth USD 10 billion.87 Israeli natural gas 
started flowing into Jordanian pipelines in January 1, 2020 for an experimental period of 
three months, after which normal exports would commence.88 However, in January 19, 
2020, the Jordanian parliament, following rising opposition to the deal,89 unanimously 
voted to ban Israeli natural gas imports.90 Public opinion and, apparently, Jordanian 
 
86 “Eastern Mediterranean,” Noble Energy, accessed March 20, 2020, 
https://www.nblenergy.com/operations/eastern-mediterranean. 
87 Sujata Ashwarya, “Israel’s Mediterranean Gas Governance: Evolution of Domestic Regulations and 
Emerging Regional Issues,” Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies 11, no. 4 (2017): 92, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/25765949.2017.12023319. 
88 Suleiman Al-Khalidi, “Jordan Gets First Natural Gas Supplies from Israel,” Reuters, January 1, 
2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/jordan-israel-gas-idUSL8N2960Q9. 
89 Omar Akour, “Jordanians Protest Gas Deal with Israel,” AP NEWS, January 17, 2020, 
https://apnews.com/7910072fdebb8a670db829cf7962e9c6. 
90 Suleiman Al-Khalidi, “Jordan Parliament Passes Draft Law to Ban Gas Imports from Israel,” 
Reuters, January 19, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-jordan-israel-gas-idUSKBN1ZI0H2. 
30 
politicians oppose the deal, blaming Israel for the oppression of Palestinians. It is still 
unclear how this vote will affect the implementation of the gas deal. 
Leviathan and Tamar partners have signed a deal with Egyptian company 
Dolphinus Holdings for the supply of 85 bcm of natural gas over fifteen years; 60 bcm will 
be provided by the Leviathan deposit and the remaining 25 bcm from Tamar.91 The 
estimated value of the deal is USD 19.5 billion.92 Exporting natural gas to Egypt is a good 
choice for Israel, as it is a very large market in the region. However, as the domestic 
production of natural gas in Egypt is growing, its imports will diminish and eventually end. 
Egypt could still opt to import Israeli natural gas in order to export it, after liquifying it at 
the LNG plants it operates. However, as Egypt’s natural gas production increases, and 
considering that the LNG plants have a limited liquification capacity, a time could come 
when imported Israeli natural gas exceeds their capabilities. At that time, Egypt would 
probably cease imports from Israel. 
The most profitable export client for Israeli natural gas would be Turkey.93 Turkey 
is close to Israel and has a huge domestic natural gas market, which Turkey has to supply 
through imports, as it has no natural gas production of its own. However, the relations 
between the two nations are currently bad, and reaching an agreement for the supply of 
natural gas would be difficult. Additionally, a pipeline from Israel to Turkey must first go 
through the EEZ of either Cyprus or Lebanon and Syria. Cyprus would probably block the 
deal because of its disputes with Turkey, and Lebanon and Syria because of their relations 
to Israel. Therefore, at the present, it seems highly unlikely that Turkey is a viable option 
for exporting natural gas from Israel.  
Israel, Cyprus, and Greece signed an agreement to build a pipeline connecting the 
Israeli and Cypriot deposits to Greece and subsequently Italy and the European Union. The 
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annual capacity of the pipeline will be 10 bcm. The pipeline is very expensive, at an 
estimated cost of USD 7 billion,94 and will probably face strong Turkish opposition during 
its construction, especially in areas that Turkey claims as its own EEZ. However, the 
project enjoys the support of both the United States and the European Union, as it would 
provide an additional source of natural gas to Europe, reducing its dependency on Russian 
natural gas. It is not clear if the project will progress. In any case, the pipeline will not be 
able to deliver natural gas until at least 2025.95 
A final option to export natural gas is to build a floating liquefied natural gas 
(FLNG) facility to liquify natural gas from Leviathan and export it by LNG vessels. 
According to Reuters, the Leviathan partners asked for plans for an FNLG facility in order 
to evaluate their options.96 That option would give Israel the opportunity to sell its natural 
gas to any potential customer around the world. The report did not comment on the 
potential location of the FNLG facility. However, since the Leviathan Platform is already 
connected to the production wells and performs all the processing of the natural gas, it is 
likely that the FLNG facility would only liquify the natural gas produced by the Leviathan 
platform and would, therefore, be located close to its position. 
If Israel fails to secure export orders for the maximum production capability of its 
production facilities, it could limit production and preserve its reserves for future sales or 
domestic consumption. However, the companies which operate the deposits might then be 
unable to recoup their investments and could sustain severe financial damages. 
b. Geopolitical 
The developments in the resources’ exploration and exploitation in the Eastern 
Mediterranean have affected the relations between Israel and the other nations of the 
region. The most important development is the establishment of the Eastern Mediterranean 
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Gas Forum, which according to the Israeli Ministry of Energy is “a regional cooperation 
platform for developing the natural gas fields in the Mediterranean area.”97 The members 
of the forum are Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority, 
while France has also asked to join.98 The forum is an example of how cooperation in 
exploitation of natural resources can unite countries. However, the absence of Turkey and 
Lebanon highlight existing disputes over EEZ delimitation issues, which could lead to 
rising tensions and even hostilities. Turkey has EEZ delimitation issues with both Greece 
and Cyprus, while Lebanon has delimitation disputes with Israel. 
Israel is starting to enjoy a more prominent role in the international community, 
assuming a leading role in energy developments in the region. Israel’s relations to Cyprus 
and Greece, in particular, have greatly improved. It is cooperating with both countries more 
closely in many sectors, including military cooperation.99 
3. Risks 
a. Geopolitical 
The downside of the discovery and exploitation of natural gas by Israel in the 
geopolitical sector is the possibility of provoking hostilities with Lebanon. The two states 
have overlapping claims over a common area of 330 square miles in their EEZs,100 which, 
if one side tries to explore, might compel the other to react. The potential for conflict is 
large, as demonstrated by the official website of the Lebanese Army, which includes a 
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report prepared by a general about the potential conflict between Israel and Lebanon over 
oil and gas resources.101 Hezbollah has also warned that it would attack Israel if it violates 
the claimed Lebanese EEZ.102 As a result, and since Israel has currently an abundance of 
natural gas to exploit from other deposits, Israel has refrained from exploring the Alon-D 
deposit which is located close to the disputed area.103 
b. Environmental 
Pollution created during the natural gas production and distribution process is a 
concern. While the consumption of natural gas creates less pollution than coal for the same 
purpose, the gas production process risks polluting the environment. Gas production 
platforms are large, complex structures, which emit large quantities of exhaust fumes and 
produce condensate and wastewater as byproducts. The production platforms are not the 
only possible pollutants; pipelines may also leak condensate into the sea. Underwater 
methane leakages, either from pipelines or the production wells result in poisoned fish, but 
methane is usually dissolved in the water before reaching the surface (especially when 
released at great depths).104  
The proximity of the Leviathan Platform to the coast of Israel, just 10 kilometers 
(6 nautical miles) west of Dor and close to the city of Haifa has caused demonstrations and 
public demands for its relocation further away from the coast. There have been complaints 
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about the pollution it allegedly creates.105 However, the initial test runs of the platform 
indicated that the platform did not cause any significant pollution.106   
An accident or attack on a production platform could create a major environmental 
disaster.107 While the natural gas would burn or dissipate during the explosion, condensate 
would leak to the sea. Additionally, the whole platform could sink, dragging hazardous 
materials with it underwater, adding to the pollution. The proximity of the Tamar platform 
and, even more important, the Leviathan platform to the coast means that the pollution 
would reach the shores very quickly and could also compromise the quality of the water 
near desalination plants, severely damaging Israel’s freshwater production, as well as its 
tourism industry. 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter examined the effects of the discovery and subsequent exploitation of 
large natural gas deposits for Israel. It produced five key findings that inform the rest of 
the thesis. First, the exploitation of Israel’s natural gas discoveries provides a boost for the 
Israeli economy. Even without considering the profits from natural gas exports, the other 
economic benefits are already contributing to Israel’s economic growth. Second, exporting 
natural gas to neighboring countries or to other nations through neighboring countries’ 
facilities provides opportunities for Israel to cooperate with these neighboring nations and 
improve relations; however, Israel’s relations with Lebanon might deteriorate as a result of 
their EEZ dispute. Third, Israel faces significant challenges in finding reliable, long-term 
export customers for its natural gas. For the next 10–15 years, the deal with Egypt may 
suffice, especially if exports to Jordan continue as agreed upon, but all the export options 
described above should be pursued in order for Israel to be able to continuously export 
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natural gas and grow its economy. Fourth, the production of natural gas is currently 
concentrated on only two offshore platforms, Leviathan and Tamar, which are relatively 
close to the shore (Section B, Figure 2). If a non-state or state actor decided to attack 
Israel’s natural gas production, these production platforms would be targets of critical 
importance. Finally, in order to effectively cripple Israel’s energy production capabilities, 
both the Leviathan and Tamar production platforms would have to be incapacitated, since 
the annual natural gas production of each one is greater than Israel’s annual consumption. 
Israel’s natural gas infrastructure will become even more redundant when production from 
other deposits begins. 
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III. OFFSHORE GAS PLATFORM VULNERABILITIES 
Offshore gas platforms are highly valuable since their operation provides the state 
with valuable income and energy security. They are also very dangerous to operate and 
need advanced safety features to prevent disasters. State or non-state actors could, 
therefore, have incentives to conduct attacks on offshore platforms, exploiting their 
vulnerabilities. However, statistics indicate that attacks on offshore gas platforms are 
extremely rare. 
A. RISKS DURING NORMAL OFFSHORE PLATFORM OPERATIONS 
Offshore gas platforms are generally large and complex structures. Natural gas is 
continuously brought on board the platforms, whether the platforms stand on top of the 
natural gas deposits or are located somewhere distant. Depending on their function 
(drilling, processing, storage, or offloading) and the water depth they operate in, there are 
several different types of offshore gas platforms. Regardless of their design and size 
variations, all the platforms share one characteristic: they process natural gas in a confined 
space, under sometimes challenging weather conditions.  
The limited space on offshore platforms places natural gas piping in close proximity 
to various machinery. This layout increases the possibility of leaked natural gas meeting a 
spark or a fire, resulting in an explosion. Any natural gas leakage could potentially lead to 
an explosion, provided the concentration of the gas in the air becomes sufficient (between 
its lower and upper explosive limit) and a spark or fire is present.108 The explosion could 
then cause additional fire and leakage, wreaking havoc on the platform.  
The limited space also accounts for the proximity of the personnel’s living quarters 
and workstations to the production facilities. During an emergency, there are no safe places 
for the crew’s retreat; the only way to safety is to evacuate the platform. That being said, 
the crew has only two options for escaping: rescue or support vessels and helicopters. Both 
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methods have serious limitations. They depend on weather conditions, as heavy seas and 
storms could prevent operation of helicopters and lowering of life rafts or docking of rescue 
vessels. The distance of the platform from another offshore platform, port, or helicopter 
base could also prevent rescue forces from arriving in time to evacuate the crew. 
Any natural gas leakage or fire on board an offshore platform thus creates a 
dangerous situation, which has the potential to rapidly escalate, endanger the safety of the 
crew, and lead to the destruction of the platform. The operation of offshore gas platforms 
therefore entails considerable risks, even without taking into account the threat of being 
attacked by terrorists or the armed forces of another nation. Despite the rigorous safety 
measures that are employed on offshore platforms, many disasters have occurred over the 
years, some of which were caused by natural gas leakage. According to data from the 
Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), an agency under the U.S. 
Department of Interior, the yearly averages of incidents on board U.S. offshore oil and gas 
platforms from 2007–18 were 111.6 fire incidents, 18.2 gas leaks, 2.7 explosions, 256.3 
injuries, and 9.5 fatalities.109 The severity of each incident varied, ranging from minor fires 
or leakages which were managed without causing serious damage or injuries, to the 2010 
Deepwater Horizon incident, which caused 11 fatalities and spilled 4.9 million barrels of 
oil into the Gulf of Mexico.110 On a global scale, the disaster of the Piper Alpha offshore 
platform in the North Sea (United Kingdom) has been the deadliest, claiming the lives of 
165 people111 and destroying the platform, causing damages of $1.4 billion.112 
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B. SECURITY THREATS 
The normal, everyday risks inherent in offshore gas platform operations are 
exacerbated by the different types of security threats that state or non-state actors can pose 
to the platforms, which include piracy, terrorism, insurgency, organized crime, vandalism, 
civil protest, internal sabotage, and interstate hostilities. 
States or non-state actors may threaten the security of offshore gas platforms in 
different ways and for different reasons. Kashubsky identifies nine types of security threats 
against offshore platforms and briefly analyzes each, focusing on geography and enabling 
factors, motivations and objectives, and capabilities and tactics.113 These types of threats 
are: piracy, terrorism, insurgency, organized crime, vandalism, civil protest, internal 
sabotage, interstate hostilities, and cyber threats. He also adds a tenth type, named 
unauthorized/suspicious conduct. The list, as well as the analysis of each threat, is 
complete; however, I believe that no matter how new cyber threats are and how dangerous 
they have become, they do not warrant be labeled an independent type of security threat. 
While Kashubsky argues that “Cyber threats can include any of the categories of offshore 
security threats discussed earlier in this chapter,”114 I posit that cyber threats should be 
included as a method of attack in the other categories of threats, since terrorists can use 
cyber-terrorism, states can use cyber-warfare, organized crime can use cyber-crime, etc.  
Kashubsky reports a total of 113 security incidents and attacks on offshore 
platforms that occurred from 1975–2014.115 Analyzing these incidents reveals important 
trends. First, the fact that only 15 of the incidents were recorded prior to 1995 indicates 
that attacks on offshore platforms are a relatively new practice (Figure 6). Second, the most 
frequent perpetrators of attacks were insurgents, accounting for 33 of the attacks 
(approximately 30%), with incidents caused by environmental activists coming in second 
(25 incidents, 22%). Third, half of all incidents and most of the attacks were conducted in 
Nigeria, mostly by insurgents. Fourth, and important, only two attacks (1.7%) were 
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conducted by terrorists (Jamaah Tauhid Wal Jihad attacks on two Iraqi offshore oil 
terminals in 2004). Finally, the majority of the attacks did not severely damage the 
platforms. Apart from 5 out of the 10 interstate incidents/attacks on offshore platforms, 
which resulted in serious damages or destruction, only 4 other attacks caused serious 
damages to the offshore platforms. All of these were conducted by MEND insurgents in 
Nigeria in June 2009. The majority of the other attacks were kidnapping of personnel for 
ransom. It appears that the perpetrators were careful not to inflict damage on the platforms, 
in order to safely board the platform and kidnap crew members, as well as negotiate with 
the platform owner under conditions favorable to the kidnappers.  
 
Figure 6. Number of attacks and security incidents on offshore 
installations116 
The lack of terrorist attacks on offshore platforms is unsurprising if the overall 
number of terrorist attacks on maritime targets are examined. According to data from the 
Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which is managed by the National Consortium for the 
Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland, 
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only 0.2% of the terrorist attacks from 1970–2018 were against maritime targets (377 out 
of 191,464 attacks).117 The maritime targets include port facilities, further reducing the 
number of attacks against actual offshore targets (mostly ships). In Israel, a total of 2,080 
terrorist attacks were recorded for the same period, of which only three were against 
maritime targets (0.14%), and all the attacks were against port facilities. 
C. METHODS OF ATTACK  
Depending on their goals and capabilities, as well as the defenses of the adversary, 
states or non-state actors that decide to attack offshore platforms have to select the method 
of attack that is likely to be most effective.  
Kashubsky examines methods and scenarios of attack against offshore platforms 
without discriminating between methods (e.g., armed intrusion) and goals (e.g., abduction 
and hostage taking). Nevertheless, the possible methods of attack can be better categorized 
based on the different tactics they employ, in order to achieve their goals. These methods 
follow. 
1. Declaration of Threat against the Offshore Platform 
This method is probably the least costly for the perpetrator. A single call, online 
post, or email stating that a bomb has been placed on board the platform and is about to 
detonate or that an attack against the platform is imminent can force a decision to cease 
production and even start personnel evacuation procedures until the search for the bomb or 
the alert for the attack is called off. The cost for the offshore platform company will be 
equal to the production loss, plus any costs for mobilizing rescue vessels and helicopters 
to evacuate personnel.118 A typical example of the cost of a bomb threat was the evacuation 
of the offshore platform Safe Scandinavia in 2008, after an employee dreamed that there 
was a bomb on board and started shouting “Bomb!” Fourteen helicopters and an airplane 
were mobilized for the evacuation of the crew, and 160 people were evacuated before the 
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alarm was called off. The cost of the rescue operation was estimated to be £500,000 
($993,700 in 2008 USD), while the production of approximately 14.35 million cubic 
meters of gas a day was halted for an unspecified period.119 
2. Assault 
An armed assault against an offshore platform could be conducted in order to 
achieve the following goals:  
• To inflict damage on the offshore platform using infantry weapons (rifles, 
portable anti-tank missiles, machine-guns, grenades, etc.); 
• To seize the platform and hold the crew as hostages in order to negotiate 
with the platform company and the state authorities; or 
• To kidnap crew members in order to negotiate ransom with the platform 
company.  
The second and third methods of assault on offshore platforms are the most 
common and are frequently used by insurgent groups in Nigeria (33 occurrences). 
Depending on the available resources and capabilities, the armed group may 
conduct the attack using speedboats or any other kind of surface vessel, submersibles, 
helicopters, or even diving equipment (e.g., swimmer-delivery vehicles). One of the main 
considerations during the planning and execution of an attack is the clandestine approach 
of the assailants to the offshore platforms. Their goal is either to remain undetected by the 
defensive forces or to allow the defensive forces minimal time to respond before the attack.  
3. Stand-off Attack 
This method of attack uses rockets, missiles, or drones launched against the 
offshore platform from a safe distance for the perpetrator. The goal is to inflict damage on 
the platform. The long distance that the projectile has to travel, which decreases its 
 




accuracy, and the relatively small size of the platform require that the rocket, missile, or 
drone system have accurate navigation and guidance systems. As this method requires the 
use of sophisticated military hardware, only armed forces of states and state-sponsored 
terrorist organizations can conduct such attacks. Therefore, stand-off attacks have 
historically been uncommon and were limited to 5 incidents.120  
4. Suicide Attack Using Ship or Aircraft 
This is arguably one of the most difficult method of attacks to stop, since security 
forces not only have to kill the perpetrators, but have to make sure the approaching ship or 
aircraft radically changes its course or ceases its movement before it closes in on the 
platform. The ship or aircraft could be laden with explosives to detonate in close proximity 
to the platform to maximize damage, or it could be intended to just collide with the 
operational platform, causing fires and gas leakages that would in turn cause explosions 
and the destruction of the platform. The only two terrorist attacks against offshore 
platforms, which took place in Iraq in 2004, were suicide attacks by two speedboats in one 
attack and a dhow in the other.121 The attack by the two speedboats was detected early, 
and the one speedboat was fired upon, detonating away from its target. Security forces fired 
upon the second speedboat as well, killing its crew, but failed to prevent the speedboat 
from colliding with the tanker it was targeting. Thankfully, the explosives did not detonate. 
The dhow exploded shortly after it was boarded by coalition security forces, killing 3 U.S. 
servicemen. Additionally, four or five U.S. servicemen were injured. The platform was not 
damaged by the explosion.122 
5. Sabotage 
An attack can be conducted by an aggrieved employee of the platform, an employee 
who is intentionally or unintentionally (blackmailed or coerced) cooperating with state or 
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non-state actors to sabotage the platform, or by state or non-state actors that are able to 
infiltrate the platform in order to stealthily plant explosives on board or to inflict damage 
on the platform’s systems with the intention to halt its operation or destroy it. 
6. Cyber-Attack 
The necessity of connecting offshore platforms with onshore control rooms in order 
to reduce production costs123 and also have redundancies in the platform’s controls 
provides the opportunity for state or non-state actors to hack into the offshore platform’s 
systems and inflict damage on the platform by either ceasing production or operating the 
platform in an unsafe way. The main advantage of this method, from the attacker’s 
perspective, is that, like the bomb threat, the cost is low, while the attack can be executed 
from anywhere in the world, rendering the detection of the perpetrator and the 
identification of his employer challenging. 
7. Protests and Interferences 
While this is technically not a method of attack since the perpetrators do not usually 
inflict any damage on the platforms, the occupation of the platform by protestors or even 
the presence of protestors in the proximity of the platform may cause production to cease. 
D. VULNERABILITIES OF OFFSHORE PLATFORMS 
The potential perpetrators of an attack against offshore platforms will have to study 
the vulnerabilities of the platforms in order to select the most effective method of attack. 
The offshore platforms’ vulnerabilities include the risk associated with operations, their 
lack of mobility, and the geographic location of the offshore platforms.  
The main vulnerability of offshore gas platforms is that their operation is so 
dangerous that, even with their advanced safety systems, accidents still happen. That means 
that an attack could succeed in disabling or destroying a platform if it hits the right pipeline 
(natural gas) in the right place (close to a spark or flame, which could be created by the 
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attack itself). An indicative example is the disaster of Mumbai High North in the Indian 
Ocean. The multipurpose support vessel (MSV) Samudra Suraksha collided with the 
offshore platform after it had approached the platform to disembark an injured crew 
member. High seas pushed the 5,006-ton vessel124 onto the offshore platform, causing the 
rupture of one or more export gas-lift risers. This resulted in a fire and explosions, which 
caused the deaths of 22 crew members of the platform and MSV, the sinking of the MSV, 
and upwards of $200 million damage to the platform.125 Similarly, a hijacked merchant 
vessel could collide with an offshore gas platform at a much higher speed, an aircraft could 
crash onto it, or a missile or rocket could hit it and cause similar or worse damage. 
Another vulnerability is that offshore gas platforms are either fixed to the bottom 
of the sea or anchored to the bottom by a large number of anchors. That means they are 
practically static targets, and their position is known to all mariners familiar with the local 
waters. The platforms could be monitored by fishing vessels, sailing boats, merchant 
vessels or even unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), in order to establish the strengths and 
weaknesses of their security measures, which are critical for the planning of any attack. 
Offshore platforms’ lack of mobility also renders them incapable of evading attacks, 
leaving fighting off the attackers as their only option.  
Finally, the proximity of the offshore platforms to the coast can factor into their 
vulnerability in different ways. A close proximity to the coastline, as in the case of the 
Leviathan platform, which is only 6 nautical miles from the shoreline, gives the attackers 
the opportunity to monitor the platform and scout its defenses from the land. The presence 
of smaller boats, like speedboats or sailboats, is usual, and potential attackers can use such 
boats to monitor the platform or to approach it for the actual attack. The proximity to the 
shore would make the demonstration effect of any attack much more effective, as locals 
could view the burning platform themselves, and TV crews would make sure that 
everybody else could see a live feed of the disaster. 
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On the other hand, having the offshore platform close to the shore offers some 
advantages to the host nation. Major of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) Assaf Harel 
discusses the different rights that a nation possesses inside its territorial sea (12 nautical 
miles for Israel) and inside its exclusive economic zone (EEZ).126 He agrees with 
Kashubsky and Anthony Morrison127 that coastal states can declare security zones around 
offshore platforms that are inside their territorial sea of whatever size they deem necessary 
in order to protect them, providing the zones do not affect the innocent passage of foreign 
ships and the safety of navigation.128 In contrast, if the offshore platform is located outside 
the territorial sea of the nation, but still inside its EEZ, like the offshore platforms of Tamar 
and Mari-B in Israel, the nation can only declare a 500-meter safety zone around the 
platform. In addition, the coastal state lacks the right to take active measures to enforce this 
zone on any foreign vessel, should it choose to breach its boundaries, and, therefore, any 
foreign vessel can enter with impunity. 
In practice, Israel has installed four marker buoys around the Leviathan Platform 
(1.5 nautical miles north, east, south and west of its position) and has promulgated the 
Notice to mariners No. 038/2019, which instructs all vessels to “keep a safe distance of 1.5 
nautical miles from the production platform.”129 For the Mari-B platform, located outside 
its territorial sea, Israel was much more aggressive: the Notice to mariners No. 050/2012 
instructs all vessels to initiate and maintain communication with Haifa Rescue 
Coordination Center (RCC Haifa) or the platform when approaching within 5 nautical 
miles from the platform, and to keep a safe distance of at least 3 nautical miles. It also 
informs them that if they enter the 500 meter “non-entry” zone around the platform, 
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defensive measures will be employed.130 For drill ships, Israel promulgates notices to 
mariners with requests to keep safe distances of 2 to 5 nautical miles from the vessels.131   
Israel has, therefore, extended the zones it declares around its platforms or drill 
ships, without stating that it would take any measure should a vessel not comply with them. 
The notice to mariners for the Mari-B platform was an exception, since it explicitly stated 
that, should a vessel enter the 500-meter zone, defensive measures would be taken, 
something which would, however, be illegal. 
Israel chooses in cases it deems necessary for its national security not to abide by 
international law. Apart from the previous example, the Gaza blockade, which was 
declared in 2009 and closed all marine traffic to the Gaza Strip, is still enforced, regardless 
of international outcry and pressure.132 Any state or non-state actor would probably 
understand that when Israel declares a safety zone around its platforms it will most likely 
use any force necessary to enforce it. 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
Offshore gas platforms are large, complex structures that perform highly dangerous 
operations like extracting, processing, storing, and distributing natural gas. The risks of 
these operations are high, as the track record of offshore platforms’ disasters indicate. State 
and non-state actors have incentives to at least consider offshore platforms as targets for 
potential attacks. Depending on the perpetrators’ motivation and the vulnerabilities of the 
offshore platforms, different methods can be used to attack the offshore platforms.  
However, experience has shown that attacks on offshore platforms are rare and, 
when they occur, most of the time the goal of the perpetrators is kidnapping personnel for 
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ransom. Attacks with the goal of severely damaging or even destroying offshore platforms 
are extremely uncommon. The following chapter will contextualize this by examining the 
state and non-state actors that could potentially target Israel’s offshore gas platforms.  
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IV. THREATS TO ISRAELI OFFSHORE GAS PLATFORMS 
In addition to the intrinsic risks of operating offshore gas platforms discussed in the 
previous chapter, Israeli offshore platforms also risk being attacked by adversarial forces. 
Several terrorist organizations that are already engaged in conflicts with Israel could target 
Israel’s offshore platforms. Among them, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and 
Hezbollah are arguably the best funded, equipped, trained, and, overall, most capable. 
Regarding states hostile to Israel, Iran may have not conducted any direct attack against 
Israel, but it is actively supporting the aforementioned terrorist organizations and it has 
developed the capability to strike targets in Israel by using forward-deployed rockets and 
drones, and Iranian-based ballistic missiles. Nevertheless, Israeli offshore gas platforms do 
not seem to be ranked high as potential targets of attacks by any perpetrator, as out of 
thousands of attacks against targets in Israel, only one was reportedly aimed against an 
offshore platform. However, it is possible that the future will diverge from the past. This 
chapter analyzes the threat that each organization poses to the platforms, based on their 
capabilities. It concludes that Hezbollah and Iran have the ability to conduct successful 
attacks against Israeli offshore gas platforms, while success is unlikely for Hamas and PIJ. 
A. ATTACKS BY TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS ON ISRAEL 
Different organizations and pundits have tried to define terrorism.133 One expert, 
Brigitte Nacos, offers a robust definition as “political violence or the threat of violence by 
groups or individuals who deliberately target civilians or noncombatants in order to 
influence the behavior and actions of targeted publics and governments.”134 By this 
definition, no attack on a military target is considered a terrorist attack. However, this 
chapter examines all the attacks that have been conducted inside Israeli borders, whether 
or not they include military targets, and additionally examines some important attacks that, 
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while conducted outside Israel, demonstrate the potential perpetrators’ capabilities to 
attack Israel’s offshore gas platforms. 
The Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which is managed by the National 
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the 
University of Maryland, is a useful tool for assessing overall trends in the terrorist threat 
in every country of the world from 1970 until the end of 2018. It offers information about 
attacks, their perpetrators, victims, numbers of killed and injured, and sometimes additional 
sources for the incident. It also includes attacks on military targets. The database may skew 
perceptions of attacks’ effectiveness, as it adds the casualties (killed and injured) of the 
perpetrators to the number of civilian/military casualties.135 In addition, some attacks 
reported by other credible sources are either not included in the database or, if included, 
the attack description is mistaken or incomplete. Nevertheless, some small inaccuracies in 
the overall number of attacks or casualties will not significantly impact general conclusions 
about the threats of attacks in Israel, as well as the preeminence of some terrorist 
organizations that operate in Israel. 
According to the GTD, a total of 2,101 terrorist attacks were conducted in Israel 
from 1970 until the end of 2018.136 This amounts to an average of approximately 42.88 
attacks per year for this 49-year period. However, terrorist attacks in Israel have increased 
in frequency since 2000, as the average for this 19-year period is 62.32 attacks per year. 
This increase is mostly due to the higher number of attacks in 2008 (129) and 2014 (293), 
when confrontations between Israelis and Palestinians peaked. That said, the recording of 
attacks via rockets, missiles and mortars as a single attack makes the total number of attacks 
 
135 For example, a failed terrorist attack in which no civilians were killed but 15 members of a 
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misleading, since one such attack may include multiple rocket, missile, or mortar firings. 
Even without taking into consideration this limitation, the total number of attacks is 
staggering. However, Israel globally ranks only 25th in the list of nations with the most 
terrorist attacks.137  
Across the database, attacks on maritime targets are much less common than attacks 
on land targets. As noted in the previous chapter, only 377 out of the 191,464 recorded 
global terrorist attacks in the GTD for the period 1970–2018 were conducted against 
maritime targets (0.13%).138 Martin Murphy observes that data from a similar database, 
the RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents, show a figure of 2%.139 However, 
this database contains fewer attacks than the GTD and ends in 2009 instead of 2018. 
Furthermore, the RAND database has been updated since Murphy published his article,140 
and therefore the ratio may have changed. In any case, the consistent finding is that attacks 
on maritime targets are very uncommon. 
According to GTD data, for Israel, the ratio of attacks on maritime targets to total 
attacks is almost the same as the global ratio: 3 of the 2,101 attacks were against these 
targets (0.14%). All three attacks were conducted against port facilities and not targets 
offshore. The GTD also includes a suicide attack conducted by terrorists in an explosive-
laden fishing vessel in 2002, which is somehow not listed as a “maritime target” attack. 
Adding it to the maritime attacks brings the GTD total to four. 
Other, similar attacks are not included in the GTD dataset. In 2009, an unsuccessful 
attack was conducted with an unmanned fishing vessel which exploded at a safe distance 
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from an Israeli patrol boat off the coast of Gaza.141 In “The Threat of Maritime Terrorism 
to Israel,” Akiva Lorentz identifies more incidents of maritime terrorism in Israel since 
1970. These incidents vary from simple arms smuggling to support onshore terrorist 
activities to more complicated plans, like firing rockets from a ship and then ramming the 
explosive-laden ship against port facilities, or even coordinated terrorist attacks with 
speedboats, launched from a mothership and taking the terrorists to the shore to conduct 
their attack.142 This variation is a result of either GTD not designating some attacks as 
maritime or because of exclusive information Lorenz received by interviewing former 
Israeli Navy officers. Still, even taking into account the attacks listed in Lorentz’s article, 
the overall number of maritime attacks pales in comparison to the attacks on targets on 
land. 
Out of 1,193 attacks in Israel since 2000, only 647 (54.23%) have been claimed by 
terrorist organizations or attributed to them by authorities. A total of 33 different terrorist 
organizations have claimed these attacks over these years. The most active terrorist 
organizations in Israel today are Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Hamas and PIJ 
have conducted more than half of the attacks that have been linked to a terrorist group143 
and are still actively attacking Israel. The third most active terrorist organization is the al-
Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, which conducted a little more than half the attacks of PIJ144 but 
lacks advanced capabilities or weapons and, therefore, will not be examined further 
because it does not pose a credible threat to the platforms. The Lebanese terrorist 
organization Hezbollah, on the other hand, may not have conducted many attacks in Israel 
since 2000 (a total of 30), but its manpower, capabilities, and its declared animosity 
towards Israel are so strong that Hezbollah must be examined as a potential threat to Israel’s 
offshore gas platforms. The same applies to Iran and its Islamic Revolutionary Guards 
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Corps (IRGC), which has not conducted a direct attack against Israel yet, but is fully 
capable. 
Most attacks by these organizations are conducted by firing rockets and their 
effectiveness is very low. Most of the rockets are low-technology and poor-quality, as 
many are manufactured locally without effective quality control, which makes them very 
unreliable. It is not uncommon for the rockets to malfunction during or after the launch and 
fail to even reach Israel, let alone destroy their target. The rockets are also unguided and, 
therefore, generally inaccurate. The greater the distance the rocket travels, the more 
inaccurate it becomes. Therefore, in most cases, it is difficult to determine the actual 
intended target of the attacks.145 Additionally, Israel has employed the very efficient 
defense system Iron Dome, which intercepts and destroys 85–90% of incoming rockets 
that are destined to land inside its interception range. Nevertheless, the psychological effect 
of these attacks should not be underestimated. 
B. ORGANIZATIONS LIKELY TO CONDUCT ATTACKS ON ISRAELI 
OFFSHORE GAS PLATFORMS 
Four organizations—Hamas, PIJ, Hezbollah, and IRGC-Quds Force—will be 
examined to determine their goals, their weapons and capabilities, and the methods of 
attack they use. The goal of this analysis is to reveal whether these organizations have the 
ability to conduct attacks on offshore targets, not taking into account Israel’s defenses. The 
potential effectiveness of such attacks over the Israeli countermeasures will be evaluated 
in the final chapter. 
1. Hamas 
Hamas is a Palestinian, Sunni Muslim political and armed terrorist organization 
which controls the Gaza Strip. Hamas, which has always enjoyed extremely close ties with 
Iran, is a large organization that has both a political party and a military wing. Founded in 
1987, Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip in 2007 through a democratic election and 
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since then has been ruling politically over the Palestinians who live there. The strategic 
goal of Hamas is to create an Islamic state in the area of Israel and the Palestinian territories 
(Gaza Strip and West Bank). Hamas, therefore, considers Israel an enemy state that must 
be dissolved in order to establish an Islamic state. However, an amendment in Hamas’s 
doctrine in 2017 has somewhat softened its demands, providing for a possible temporary 
acceptance of a smaller Palestinian state inside the pre-1967 borders, without, however, 
recognizing Israel.146 
As stated above, Hamas is the most active terrorist organization in Israel, having 
conducted at least 199 attacks since 2000. Each rocket or mortar attack usually involves 
multiple firings. For example, during the 2014 military confrontation between Israel and 
Hamas, Hamas fired more than 2,600 rockets against Israel.147 The Israeli Defense Forces 
(IDF) website reports a total of 12,000 rockets and 5,000 mortars launched by Hamas 
against Israel since Hamas was established.148  
A more detailed examination of Hamas’s methods of attacks can provide useful 
insight on the targeting policy of the organization. In the early 2000s (until the end of 
2004), Hamas attacks were mostly suicide bombings, along with a few assaults with 
firearms. These attacks resulted in an average of 6.5 fatalities and 28.4 injuries.149 Since 
2005, rockets, mortars, and some missiles have become Hamas’s preferred method of 
attack, along with some firearms assaults, stabbing attacks, vehicle ramming attacks, and 
very few bombings. The effectiveness of the attacks was dramatically reduced by this 
change of tactics. Each attack after 2005 resulted in 0.36 fatalities and 1.24 injuries.  
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The change of tactics was a response to Israeli counterterrorism policies, especially 
the building of the barrier between Israeli and Palestinian territories.150 The new tactics 
were also caused by the introduction of new weapon systems into Hamas’s arsenal. Hamas 
first launched rockets against Israel in 2002.151 As conducting suicide bombings became 
more difficult, the use of rockets for the attacks gradually became Hamas’s main method 
of attack.  
Hamas has also recently procured an unspecified number of Ababil unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAVs) from Iran. The drones Hamas operates can allegedly conduct 
surveillance, attacks (munition-dropping), or suicide-attacks (UAV impact on target).152 
Another report claims that Hamas produced thirty drones in Gaza, under the supervision of 
a Tunisian engineer, who was assassinated in 2016.153 
Hamas has conducted some terrorist attacks on maritime targets, but they have been 
unsuccessful. Hamas’s first attempt at maritime terrorism was to detonate a life raft close 
to an Israeli patrol boat. The attack failed, as Israeli sailors fired upon the raft and the 
detonation occurred at a safe distance from the patrol boat.154 Hamas has also conducted 
four maritime infiltration attacks. In this kind of attacks, the perpetrators try to bypass any 
defenses by approaching their targets from the sea. In Hamas’s case, swimmers or divers 
try to leave the Gaza Strip by sea and reach the Israeli coast to the north in order to 
subsequently conduct attacks ashore. In the first three attacks, which occurred in 2002 and 
2004, the terrorists were detected swimming in the sea and were killed before they reached 
the shore.155 In the fourth attack, in 2014, four terrorists infiltrated the Israeli coastline. 
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However, they were killed forty minutes after they reached shore, before they could inflict 
any damage.156 
Importantly, Hamas has also already conducted an attack on an Israeli offshore gas 
platform. In August 2014, Hamas fired two rockets against the platforms Mari-B or Tamar, 
which are located some 30 kilometers from the Gaza Strip coast.157 The rockets did not hit 
the platforms, since they are generally highly inaccurate and unreliable. The Israelis did 
not report whether they used any defensive system to intercept the rockets or not. However, 
Hamas could launch further attacks against the Israeli offshore platforms that are close to 
the Gaza Strip (Mari-B, Tamar Platform), but the chances of success will remain negligible 
until the accuracy of the rockets is greatly improved. 
To improve its capabilities, Hamas has tried to acquire Iranian anti-ship missiles, 
which could be used to target Israeli warships or merchant vessels, as well as offshore gas 
platforms. According to Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism report, in 2011, the Israeli 
Navy seized a cargo ship, which carried six Iranian Nasr-1 anti-ship missiles, along with 
other military hardware, 200 nautical miles off the coast of Israel.158 These radar-guided 
missiles have a range of 20.5 nautical miles (38 kilometers). The Tamar Platform, which 
is located 25 kilometers west of Ashkelon,159 would be within range of these missiles if 
they were fired from the Gaza Strip. 
Another indication that Hamas is planning to upgrade its maritime attack 
capabilities is the expansion of its naval commando unit. This unit undertakes maritime 
infiltration missions, like the four incidents described above. In 2018, the Israeli Air Force 
destroyed a tunnel to Israel near the northern borders of Gaza Strip. The tunnel, the entrance 
of which was close to the shore, could be used by Hamas’s naval commando divers to 
clandestinely enter the water and then swim undetected to Israel, bypassing the 
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breakwater.160 Apart from infiltration missions, the naval commando unit could conduct 
attacks on maritime targets, including offshore platforms, using boats or life rafts, either 
laden with explosives or carrying armed commandos to assault a target (offshore or 
onshore). If the divers gain enough experience through conducting simpler missions and 
are properly equipped with underwater scooters or diver propulsion devices (DPDs) they 
could try to approach the offshore platforms while submerged and either plant explosives 
or conduct an assault. 
Currently, Hamas does not pose a credible threat to Israeli offshore platforms. Its 
rockets are inaccurate and unreliable, and its mortars lack the range to reach the platforms. 
The naval commando unit is as yet unproven in combat and, therefore, undertaking a very 
complicated and demanding operation against a very well defended target, like the Israeli 
offshore gas platforms, seems doomed to fail. The drones could pose a more credible threat; 
however, this is impossible to evaluate without detailed information about their 
capabilities. The situation could radically change if Iran was to provide either anti-ship 
missiles or more accurate rockets to Hamas. 
2. Palestinian Islamic Jihad 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad is also a Palestinian, Sunni Muslim terrorist organization 
operating from the Gaza Strip, with ideological and operational similarities to Hamas. It 
was founded in 1979, and its goal is to create an Islamic state in the borders of Israel and 
Palestinian lands. However, it is even more radical than Hamas, not willing under any 
conditions to negotiate with Israel and aiming for nothing less than its destruction. The 
main difference between Hamas and the PIJ is that the latter does not wield any political 
power, being, therefore, a dedicated, unrestrained terrorist group. PIJ has strong ties with 
Hezbollah and Iran, which support it with financial and military aid, as well as training.161 
PIJ’s close relationship with Iran was tested by strong disagreements over the civil war in 
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Syria and Iran stopped funding PIJ in 2015. However, even though some disagreements 
remain, in 2016, relations between PIJ and Iran improved and Iran has reportedly resumed 
funding PIJ.162  
According to the GTD, PIJ conducted 162 attacks on Israel from 2000 to 2018. An 
analysis of these attacks shows the same patterns as Hamas’s attacks. In the early 2000s 
(until the end of 2005), most of PIJ’s attacks were suicide bombings, along with a few 
assaults with firearms. These attacks resulted in average of 4.99 fatalities and 22.53 
injuries.163 Since 2006, the use of rockets and mortars has become PIJ’s main method of 
attack, along with some firearms assaults, and very few bombings. Like Hamas’s attacks, 
the effectiveness of PIJ’s attacks was greatly reduced because of this alteration of tactics. 
Each attack after 2006 resulted in 0.17 fatalities and 0.94 injuries.164  
PIJ has only attempted one maritime attack. In 2002, a fishing boat, which was 
laden with explosives, was intercepted off the coast of Gaza by the Israeli patrol boat INS 
Daboor. The two PIJ operatives who were onboard the fishing boat detonated the 
explosives when Daboor closed in, killing themselves and injuring four Israeli sailors.165  
No sources indicate that PIJ has made any progress to upgrade its maritime attack 
capabilities. While a report by the Israel Security Agency (ISA, or Shin Bet) in 2005 
claimed that PIJ was trying to create a maritime terrorism unit,166 there is no evidence that 
this unit was ever activated. Suspicions were also raised in 2011 that the Nasr-1 anti-ship 
missiles captured by the Israeli Navy were destined for delivery to PIJ and not Hamas. 
However, the missiles were most likely going to Hamas.167  
Overall, PIJ seems to be less able than Hamas to conduct maritime attacks. 
Launching rockets is currently its only available method of attack against Israel’s offshore 
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gas platforms, but the inaccuracy and unreliability of the rockets, in addition to the 
capabilities of Israeli defenses, make such attacks extremely unlikely to succeed. However, 
PIJ is regularly in an outbidding contest with Hamas. As its relationship with Iran 
strengthens, it is likely that PIJ will try to upgrade its rocket inventory, to acquire anti-ship 
missiles, and create a naval commando unit. 
3. Hezbollah 
Hezbollah is a Lebanese, Shia Muslim organization. Founded in 1982, Hezbollah 
has always enjoyed extremely close ties with Iran. Hezbollah is a large organization that 
has a political party and a military wing. The political party has enjoyed considerable 
success in recent elections in Lebanon.168 Some nations have designated Hezbollah as a 
terrorist organization (most notably the U.S., the United Kingdom, France, and of course 
Israel), while the European Union has designated only Hezbollah’s military wing as a 
terrorist organization. Hezbollah does not recognize the State of Israel, and its goal, 
according to its most recent manifesto of November 2009, is to “liberate” Palestine and 
Jerusalem from Israeli occupation with the assistance of all Arabs and Muslims.169 
From 2000–18, Hezbollah conducted terrorist attacks in six countries. According 
to the GTD, out of a total of 82 attacks, 37 were in Lebanon, 30 in Israel, 7 in Syria, 6 in 
Bahrain, 1 in Bulgaria, and 1 in the West Bank.170 The pattern of Hezbollah attacks in 
Israel is substantially different from Hamas’s and PIJ’s. Rocket, mortar, or missile attacks 
account for a little over 50% of the attacks (17 out of 30, 56.67%) and the rest of the attacks 
are almost equally split between assaults (7) and bombings (6). Additionally, Hezbollah 
did not at any time during this period alter its methods of attacks, as Hamas and PIJ did 
when they started conducting more rocket/mortar attacks instead of bombings in 2004–05. 
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Hezbollah’s rocket arsenal is substantial. After its 2006 war against Israel, in which 
Hezbollah fired thousands of rockets, Hezbollah built up its rocket inventory and currently 
possesses more than 100,000 rockets of various types, including rockets with ranges up to 
210 kilometers.171 With this range, from southern Lebanon Hezbollah can target the 
majority, if not all, of Israel’s offshore platforms.  
In the maritime domain, Hezbollah has conducted a single attack. During the 2006 
war with Israel, Hezbollah launched two anti-ship missiles against the Israeli Navy corvette 
Hanit (Saar 5 class), which was at the time some 6 nautical miles (10 kilometers) off the 
coast of Lebanon, killing four crew members. The missiles launched were either both C-
802s or one C-802 and one C-701.172 Both types of missiles are Chinese-designed and 
probably made in Iran.  
The attack was a perfect opportunity for Hezbollah to conduct psychological 
operations: Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, announced the attack and asked the 
residents of Beirut to look west to see the Israeli warship burning.173 Hezbollah later posted 
a video online, showing the launch of the missiles and the explosion of the missile on Hanit 
in the distance.174 The attack was deemed a major success for Hezbollah, as it not only 
managed to damage one of the most advanced Israeli warships, but did it in plain sight, for 
all Beirutis to see. 
Hezbollah has since acquired even more modern and capable anti-ship missiles than 
the C-802. According to multiple sources, Hezbollah obtained a number of Russian 
Yakhont (P-800) anti-ship missiles, as part of a 2007 order by the Syrian government for 
72 missiles. It is not known how many of the missiles were actually delivered to Syria 
before the outbreak of the civil war,175 but it is reported that, despite Israeli efforts, an 
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unspecified number of missiles were transferred to Hezbollah.176 The missiles travel more 
than twice as fast as most anti-ship missiles (2-2.1 instead of 0.9 Mach), making them hard 
to shoot down, and have a maximum range of 162 nautical miles (300 kilometers).177 With 
this range, Hezbollah may fire the missiles from as far north as Beirut and still target any 
Israeli offshore gas platform. As the missile is equipped with a powerful warhead (200kg 
/ 440lbs),178 and adding the kinetic energy of the missile impact and the burning of any 
remaining fuel to the effects of the warhead explosion, even one missile hit could result to 
the destruction of an offshore platform.  
In addition to operating anti-ship missiles, in 2004–06, Hezbollah acquired at least 
10 Ababil unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) (8 Ababil-T and 2 Ababil-IIIs) from Iran. The 
range of Ababil-T is 27 nautical miles (50 kilometers), while Ababil-III UAVs have a range 
of 75 nautical miles (140 kilometers). Both types of UAVs could be used for attack, by 
detonating on impact, and the Ababil-III could be used for reconnaissance/surveillance. 
Although Israel shot down both Ababil-IIIs in 2004,179 Hezbollah has been upgrading its 
remaining Ababil UAVs with munition-dropping capabilities.180 However, the Ababil-T’s 
range does not allow it to reach any Israeli offshore platform if they are launched from 
Lebanon. Hezbollah has also been developing other UAVs, but details of their capabilities 
are not known to Western sources. According to Nasrallah, these UAVs can carry 40 
kilograms of explosives.181 Depending on their range, Hezbollah could use its UAVs to 
gain essential information for planning attacks on Israel’s offshore platforms, use them for 
attacks, or record and transmit video and still images of attacks. 
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Hezbollah has also operated an amphibious warfare unit since the 1990s and may 
have procured semi-submersible boats and swimmer-delivery vehicles from Iran,182 which 
could be very useful for approaching and attacking an offshore platform undetected. 
Finally, Hezbollah has extensive experience in smuggling weapons, other supplies, and 
people to the Gaza Strip.183 
One of the most important factors that has reduced Hezbollah’s attacks on Israeli 
targets is its heavy involvement in the Syrian civil war and in Yemen. Hezbollah’s forces 
may be stretched thin, but its fighters are gaining invaluable experience by participating in 
actual war. For example, Jane’s reports that Hezbollah operators have launched Syrian 
M600 rockets, which Hezbollah has also acquired, against Saudi Arabian targets.184 By 
conducting these attacks, Hezbollah gains valuable experience and evaluates the 
effectiveness of the weapons it could potentially use against Israel in the future. The 
cooperation with the Houthis can also benefit Hezbollah’s amphibious warfare unit, as the 
Houthis have conducted numerous attacks on ships using explosive-laden speedboats.185 
While Hezbollah has not attacked any Israeli offshore gas platforms, Nasrallah has 
announced that, if Israel disrupts the exploration of oil and gas in the Lebanese EEZ or 
attacks Lebanese oil and gas facilities, Hezbollah will attack Israeli offshore gas 
platforms.186 Hezbollah has even posted pictures of Israeli offshore gas platforms, overlaid 
with red crosshairs on them, their names, and coordinates, as well as a video that shows 
the targeted platforms and footage of the Hanit attack.187 
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To summarize, Hezbollah is not only capable of attacking Israel’s offshore gas 
platforms, but is already preparing for such attacks as a response to an Israeli provocation. 
It may choose to attack the platforms by using its anti-ship missiles, its rockets (especially 
if it can improve their accuracy), drones, or its amphibious warfare unit. 
4. Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps—Quds Force 
Relations between Iran and Israel have been tense ever since the 1979 Iranian 
Revolution. The level of tension fluctuates, but the animosity between the two nations 
remains.188 Iran does not recognize the state of Israel and its leaders have frequently called 
for the dissolution of Israel.189 Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei 
issued a statement in November 2019 clarifying that, while the state of Israel should be 
eliminated, Jews would be welcome to continue living in Palestine.190  
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) is responsible for safeguarding 
the Islamic Revolution, as well as protecting Iran against foreign threats.191 The IRGC has 
been shaped by its fierce support of the clergy, its devotion to the Supreme Leader, and by 
the evolution of the Islamic Republic after the revolution.192 It is a very substantial force, 
consisting of 125,000 troops, and controls the Basij militia (approximately four million 
members) and, notably, Iran’s ballistic missiles.193  
The IRGC-QF is the special forces branch of the IRGC which undertakes Iran’s 
covert and military operations outside the borders of Iran. IRGC-QF develops and 
maintains Iran’s ties to several terrorist organizations around the world, including Hamas, 
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PIJ, and Hezbollah, providing funding, training, and military equipment.194  Iran’s support 
to terrorist organizations has prompted the U.S. State Department to include Iran on a short 
list of states sponsoring terrorism, along with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
(North Korea), Sudan, and Syria.195 The U.S. initially only designated the IRGC-QF as a 
terrorist organization in 2007, but since 2019 has also designated the entire IRGC as 
such.196  
Even though IRGC-QF has not conducted any direct attacks in Israel, it has planned 
and executed attacks on Israeli targets in other countries. IRGC-QF was allegedly involved 
in the bombing of the Argentine Jewish Mutual Association (AMIA) community center in 
Buenos Aires in 1994,197 and in the bombing attack on an Israeli diplomat in New Delhi, 
India, in 2012.198 IRGC-QF was involved in several other failed plots to attack Israeli 
targets around the world.199   
The IRGC’s military capabilities are much more advanced than those of the terrorist 
organizations analyzed above. Assisted by the intelligence and logistical support that a 
state like Iran can provide, IRGC can threaten Israel’s offshore gas platforms using 
multiple methods. 
a. Ballistic Missile / Cruise Missile / UAV (Drone) Attack 
According to various sources, Iran has a very diverse ballistic and cruise missile 
inventory, which it seeks to develop further, and already has the ability to attack Israeli 
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offshore platforms.200 The capabilities of the missiles vary, with maximum ranges between 
125 and 2,500 kilometers, and payloads of 350 to 1,000 kilograms. As the distance between 
the western part of Iran and Israeli offshore gas platforms is 1,000–1,200 kilometers, some 
types of Iranian missiles could be launched from Iranian territory and still reach Israeli 
platforms. If missiles are transported to Syria, where the Assad regime is friendly to Iran 
and the IRGC already operates,201 they could target the platforms with even shorter-range 
missiles. The shorter distance would also increase the accuracy of the missiles. Iran could 
also use UAVs for the attacks. Iran is developing or already operating at least six different 
types of UAVs.202 The maximum range of each type differs, with the Shahed 129 and 
Qods Mohajer 6 UAVs having the longest, at an estimated 2,000 kilometers (1,079 nautical 
miles).203 
Until very recently, Iranian missile capability was generally underestimated, 
especially as far as their accuracy was concerned. As recently as 2016, an Atlantic Council 
brief considered Iran’s arsenal of missiles as technologically inferior and inaccurate.204 
The same evaluation was shared by Shifrinson and Priebe, who, in a 2011 article, 
contended that Iranian ballistic missiles were so inaccurate that some 1,332 Shahab-1 
missiles would be needed to effectively destroy the stabilization towers of the Abqaiq 
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refinery in Saudi Arabia.205 The Atlantic Council’s brief argued that Iran was investing 
heavily to improve the accuracy of its missile arsenal.206  
However, recent events have demonstrated that some of Iran’s missiles and drones 
are already highly sophisticated. On September 14, 2019, the Abqaiq refinery was attacked 
by either Houthis, who claimed the attack themselves, or by Iran as the United States and 
Saudi Arabia claim. Whoever the actual perpetrator, the UAVs and missiles used were of 
Iranian design and, most probably, production. The attack was conducted with only 18 
UAVs, which were able to destroy the most critical systems of the facility (spheroids used 
to separate crude oil from natural gas and stabilization towers).207 As a result of the strike, 
Abqaiq’s production ceased until October 3.208 The contrast to Shifrinson and Priebe’s 
estimate is disturbing; instead of hundreds of missiles, just 18 slow-flying drones were able 
to disable the refinery for almost three weeks. According to the Saudis, three cruise missiles 
were also launched against the stabilization facility but missed their target. However, all 
four cruise missiles that were fired against the Khurais oil processing facility managed to 
hit their targets.209 In total, at least 17 out of 18 drones hit their target (17 estimated impact 
points),210 and 4 out of 7 cruise missiles were successful (in both attacks).  
Another event demonstrating the accuracy of Iranian missile strikes took place on 
January 7, 2020. As a retaliation for the assassination of IRGC-QF Commander General 
Qasem Soleimani, Iran launched 15 ballistic missiles against two Iraqi airbases where U.S. 
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military personnel were stationed.211 Two missiles clearly missed, but the rest reached 
their targets with high accuracy.212  
b. Assault 
The Navy branch of IRGC (IRGC-N) is experienced in using a large number of 
small boats (swarms) to attack more powerful targets.213 This tactic is being tested 
frequently during IRGC-N’s exercises.214 IRGC’s ability to launch maritime assaults was 
displayed in July 2019, when IRGC special forces assaulted and captured a British tanker 
in the Strait of Hormuz.215 The attack was conducted with simultaneous operation of 
several speedboats and helicopters. Even if the operation was conducted against a merchant 
vessel which had no means of defense, the use of fast-rope technique by the special forces, 
the coordinated action of small boats and helicopters, and the transmission of videos and 
pictures as psychological operations, all demonstrated the IRGC units’ naval capabilities.  
The IRGC could attempt an assault against Israeli offshore platforms, using either 
speedboats or helicopters. However, the probability of success would be low. The main 
obstacles to such an attack are that the areas around the offshore platforms are closely 
monitored by the IDF and that the base of operations of the assault force would likely be 
at a great distance from the platforms. Using friendly Syria as a base for the operation 
would be the safest option and the only one in which using helicopters would be possible, 
but it would be a tactical mistake, since the assault force would have to transit the entire 
coast of Lebanon and then a long distance off the coast of Israel before reaching the 
platforms. Lebanon would be closer, but even with the assistance from Hezbollah, which 
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should not be taken for granted, the distance is still significant (50 nautical miles or more). 
Hezbollah would probably be reluctant to support such an operation, as Israel would likely 
consider them as accomplices to the attack and retaliate. The Lebanese government would 
also have strong incentives to stop this operation, if it was to learn about it, as an Israeli 
invasion of southern Lebanon would be a probable aftermath of the attack. Finally, using 
the Gaza Strip would also present serious challenges; the arrival of the IRGC personnel in 
the Gaza Strip through Israeli checkpoints would be challenging in the first place, the 
imposed Israeli naval blockade would hinder the attempts of the assault force to get further 
than 3 nautical miles from the Gaza Strip, and Israel monitors the region and frequently 
conducts air attacks against potential targets in the Gaza Strip. Therefore, the assault force 
would be unable to calmly prepare the attack.  
The only feasible method of attack would be to use a mothership, which could sail 
from any port where it would be safe for the IRGC personnel to board the ship without any 
danger to either the personnel or the covertness of the operation. The platforms are close 
to Israeli ports and sea lanes and, therefore, a merchant vessel could approach the platforms 
without alerting the authorities. The attack could then be as simple as firing long-range 
anti-tank missiles to the platforms from the deck of the ship, or more complicated attacks 
that involve the launching of helicopter or speedboat from an appropriately modified ship. 
If the ship can loiter close to the platform, another method could be to deploy divers 
through an underwater escape hatch. The divers could, thus, enter the water undetected and 
stealthily approach the platform. This method could offer more chances of success, as the 
attack is stealthier, but depends on whether the mothership can loiter close to the platform 
and whether the platforms are not equipped with diver detection sonar systems. 
In sum, IRGC has the capability of attacking Israeli offshore gas platforms. Iran’s 
ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones have the required range to reach the platforms, 
even if launched from inside the borders of Iran. If Iran deploys these systems in Syria or 
Lebanon, their effectiveness will improve, as their accuracy will improve and their time of 
flight, as well as the available time for Israel to detect and destroy them will decrease. As 
demonstrated by the aforementioned recent incidents, their reliability and accuracy—
especially the drones’—is high and, therefore, they present a credible threat to the security 
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of the Israeli offshore gas platforms. While conducting an assault operation against the 
platform is possible, the probability of success is low.  
C. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter examined the maritime attacks conducted by four different
organizations, including three terrorist groups and one state, as well as their capabilities to 
conduct future attacks on Israeli offshore platforms. It produced three key findings. First, 
none of the terrorist organizations favors maritime attacks over attacks on civilians or the 
IDF. Therefore, the offshore gas platforms of Israel are not, for the time being, considered 
primary targets by these organizations. Second, out of the three non-state terrorist 
organizations, Hezbollah is currently the most capable of successfully attacking Israeli 
offshore gas platforms, since it has the necessary hardware to conduct such attacks (P-800 
Yakhont anti-ship missiles, accurate and reliable rockets). Hamas and PIJ may be the most 
active of the examined organizations in attacking Israel, but they lack the necessary 
equipment or training to effectively attack the platforms. This could change should they 
receive assistance by Iran on how to build guidance systems for their rockets, or if Iran 
provides more accurate rockets to them. Third, the IRGC is by far the most capable of all 
the examined organizations. Israel should definitely consider the attacks on the Saudi 
Arabian oil facilities and the Iraqi air bases as a warning of the increased capabilities of 
Iranian missiles and UAVs. 
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V. ISRAELI OFFSHORE GAS PLATFORM DEFENSE 
Having established the significant threats posed by state and non-state actors to 
Israeli offshore natural gas platforms, it is important to analyze how Israel perceives these 
threats and what measures it takes to protect its offshore platforms. This analysis provides 
the second component of the comparison of forces which will assist in assessing the 
severity of the threats posed by state and non-state actors to the physical security of Israeli 
offshore natural gas platforms in the next and final chapter. According to the first-ever 
public version of Israeli National Security Doctrine, which was published in 2015 and 
translated into English in 2016, Israel’s military defense planning is based on four 
principles: confrontation prevention and deterrence, early warning and intelligence, 
defense and protection, and victory and defeat.216 The defense of the Israeli offshore 
natural gas platforms is mostly based on two of those principles: confrontation prevention 
and deterrence, and defense and protection. This chapter examines how Israel defends its 
offshore natural gas platforms through the lens of these two principles. This examination 
suggests that Israel is taking considerable measures to prevent an attack on its offshore 
natural gas platforms, while also strengthening the platforms’ defense to ensure that, if 
such an attack takes place, its chances of success would be minimal. 
A. DEFENSE AND PROTECTION OF OFFSHORE ISRAELI NATURAL 
GAS PLATFORMS 
Israel has deployed substantial military forces to protect its offshore natural gas 
platforms, creating a robust, multi-layered defense system around them. The Israeli Navy 
has undertaken the main task of protecting the offshore natural gas platforms, along with 
air force planes and UAVs.217 As stated in Chapter II, the offshore platforms which 
currently need protection are the Leviathan Production Platform, located just 10 kilometers 
 
216 “Israeli Defense Forces’ Defense Doctrine - English Translation,” Belfer Center for Science and 
International Affairs, August 12, 2016, 11–12, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/israeli-defense-
forces-defense-doctrine-english-translation. 
217 Gili Cohen, “Israel Navy to Devote Majority of Missile Boats to Secure Offshore Drilling Rafts,” 
Haaretz, January 9, 2012, https://www.haaretz.com/1.5161319. 
72 
west of Dor (southwest of Haifa), and the Tamar Production Platform, located 25 
kilometers west of Ashdod (Figure 7). The Yam-Tethys platform is no longer used, as the 
deposits of Noa and Mari-B have been depleted.218 Both the Israeli Navy and Israeli Army 
recommended locating the Leviathan Production Platform close to the shore, instead of 
having a Floating Production Storage Offloading (FPSO) vessel over the gas deposits, in 
order to better protect it with land-based Iron Dome batteries. The recommendation was 
accepted. The Israeli Navy and Army also recommended that the production platform for 
the new Karish-Tanin deposit be located close to the shore. However, as this deposit is 
much smaller than Leviathan and does not have the same strategic importance for Israel, it 
was decided that production will be undertaken by an FPSO vessel close to the deposits.219 
 
Figure 7. Location of Leviathan and Tamar platforms220 
 
218 “Yam Tethys,” Delek Drilling, accessed April 16, 2020, https://www.delekdrilling.com/natural-
gas/gas-fields/yam-tethys. 
219 Amos Harel, “Fearing Hezbollah Attacks, Israeli Military Insists Gas Rigs Be Close to Shore,” 
Haaretz, July 31, 2018, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-fearing-hezbollah-attacks-israeli-
military-insists-gas-rigs-be-close-to-shore-1.6334588. 
220 Source: Delek Group, “East Med E&P.” 
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Given their proximity to the shore, land-based defense systems complement the 
naval and aerial units that protect Israel’s offshore natural gas platforms, creating a robust, 
multi-layered defense system around the platforms. Before discovering gas resources, 
Israel had already invested heavily in developing defensive systems to counter the threat 
of ballistic or cruise missiles, rockets, mortars, and UAVs to all targets. The experience of 
being attacked for decades has provided Israel strong incentives to find a way to mitigate 
these risks. Israel’s defense against rockets and missiles is composed of multiple systems: 
Arrow 2 and Arrow 3 systems are used against medium- and long-range ballistic missiles 
respectively; David’s Sling (aka Magic Wand) against aircraft and intermediate-range 
rockets; Iron Dome for medium- and short-range rockets and artillery; and Iron Beam 
against mortars.221  
The Iron Dome system, one of the most effective defensive systems in IDF’s 
inventory, is paramount for the security of Israeli offshore platforms. Since its initial 
operational deployment in 2011, Iron Dome has dramatically reduced the casualties caused 
by rocket attacks. Whereas in the 2008 war in Gaza, 62 rockets were required to inflict 
each fatality, in the 2012 war this ratio increased to 300 to 1 (five Iron Dome batteries were 
operational),222 and in 2014 this ratio became 1500 to 1 (ten Iron Dome batteries were 
operational).223 This drastic increase in the rockets-to-fatality ratio demonstrates the 
remarkable performance of Iron Dome (88% interception rate in 2012),224 as it almost 
nullified the threat of Hamas and PIJ’s rocket attacks. Hezbollah, which is equipped with 
more advanced rockets, has not conducted large-scale rocket attacks since Iron Dome 
became operational.  
 
221 Freilich, Israeli National Security: A New Strategy for an Era of Change, 219. 
222 A battery of Iron Dome is comprised of 3–4 launchers, with each launcher being loaded with 20 
interceptors (missiles). Experts estimate that 20 or more Iron Dome batteries should be deployed in order to 
provide total protection of Israel. However, in 2014, ten batteries were operational, with some sources 
claiming that Israel’s plans were to procure a total of 10–13 batteries (Freilich,, 219). 
223 Freilich, Israeli National Security: A New Strategy for an Era of Change, 220–21. 
224 Freilich, 220. 
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In addition to land-based missile defenses, the Israeli Navy is undergoing an 
expansive modernization program to upgrade its capabilities to defend Israel’s offshore 
natural gas platforms. The program’s main components are as follows:225  
1. Four Saar 6 (Magen) class corvettes. These have been ordered from 
Germany, with the first being scheduled for delivery in 2020 and the last in 2022. These 
90-meter (295.3 ft) ships, which will be the largest ships of the Israeli Navy,226 will be 
equipped with phased-array radar, which can detect targets with very low radar cross-
section (such as cruise missiles) and 32 Barak-8 surface-to-air missiles, as well as 40 C-
Dome surface-to-air missiles. Barak-8 missiles are designed to intercept and destroy 
aircraft, UAVs, and anti-ship or cruise missiles, while C-Dome missiles (the naval variant 
of Iron Dome) are designed to counter short- and medium-range rockets and artillery 
shells.227 Their armament against surface targets will be one 76mm gun and 16 anti-ship 
missiles.228 These ships seem to have incredible firepower for their size and could prove 
to be invaluable assets for defending the Israeli offshore natural gas platforms, as their 
systems can counter every possible threat. 
2. Upgrade of all three Saar 5 corvettes. These corvettes, which the Israeli 
Navy already owns, are being retrofitted with a phased-array radar, and their Barak-1 
missiles are being replaced by the more modern and capable Barak-8.229 A battery of 20 
C-Dome missiles can be temporarily installed on their helicopter landing pad, in order to 
provide capabilities to counter ballistic missiles (Figure 8). After the upgrade, the Saar 5 
corvettes will have the same systems as the Saar 6 corvettes, but with a reduced load of 
 
225 For this thesis, since submarines are not well-suited to protect the offshore platforms against the 
expected threats (mostly rockets, missiles, UAVs, speedboats), the submarine procurement and 
modernization programs will not be analyzed. 
226 Anna Ahronheim, “INS Magen Expected to Arrive in the Spring of 2020,” The Jerusalem Post, 
May 26, 2019, https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/israeli-navy-inaugurates-first-saar-6-corvette-590590. 
227 Freilich, Israeli National Security: A New Strategy for an Era of Change, 219. 
228 “Magen (Sa’ar 6) Class,” Jane’s, January 30, 2020, https://janes-ihs-
com.libproxy.nps.edu/Janes/Display/jfs_c355-jfs_. 
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75 
missiles. However, they are still likely to be highly capable of defending offshore 
platforms. 
 
Figure 8. Launch of C-Dome interceptor from INS Lahav (Sa’ar 5 class 
corvette)230 
3. Upgrade of eight Saar 4.5 missile boats. Along with a general modernization 
of all electronics and command-and-control systems, a lightweight phased-array radar is 
being installed on all Saar 4.5 missile boats which will also be equipped with 32 Barak-1 
surface-to-air missiles, a 76mm gun and anti-ship missiles.231 These ships have reduced 
capabilities compared to the Saar 5 and Saar 6 corvettes, as they are too small to be 
equipped with C-Dome missiles. However, they can still provide protection to the offshore 
platforms from surface vessels, submarines, UAVs, missiles, and aircraft. 
4. Procurement of eight Sikorsky SH-60F multi-mission helicopters. These 
helicopters will operate from the Saar 6 corvettes and can contribute to the defense of the 
 




offshore platforms by detecting incoming surface and sub-surface threats, as well as 
destroying these threats with their missiles or torpedoes.232 
The Israeli Navy also operates a large number of patrol vessels, which can patrol 
the area close to the offshore platforms, communicate with approaching vessels, and, if 
necessary, act against the vessels that do not comply with instructions. Coastal radar 
stations, UAVs, and maritime patrol aircraft (MPAs) provide additional surveillance 
capabilities and greatly enhance Israel’s maritime situation awareness (MSA). 
As part of its MSA, Israel is monitoring merchant vessel traffic inside its EEZ very 
closely in order to detect any suspicious movements as soon as possible. All ships heading 
to Israeli ports are required to contact the Hefa (Haifa) coastal station when they are 100 
nautical miles off the coast of Israel. These ships are also advised by Israeli authorities to 
take specific approach routes marked on nautical charts.233 Therefore, it is very difficult 
for a ship to divert from the expected route and approach an offshore platform without 
being detected.  
Both the Tamar and Leviathan production platforms are distant from busy approach 
routes, facilitating their security operations (Figure 9). The Tamar Production Platform is 
approximately 15 kilometers (8.1 nautical miles) away from an approach route, while the 
Leviathan Production Platform is much closer, approximately 4 kilometers (2.2 nautical 
miles), but to a relatively unused route that connects Ashkelon and Haifa. Observation of 
maritime traffic off the coast of Israel over April 2020 using the website 
 
232 Jane’s, “Israel - Navy.” 
233 The United Kingdom Hydrographic Office, “Admiralty Sailing Directions – Mediterranean Pilot 
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Marinetraffic.com234 demonstrated light merchant vessel traffic in this route.235 All the 
merchant vessels in the route were transiting from Haifa to Ashkelon and vice versa. They 
also kept at least 8.7 kilometers (4.7 nautical miles) away from the platform, transiting on 
the western edge of the route. In two cases, ships were transiting from Ashkelon to Haifa 
on the eastern edge when they radically altered their course to keep clear of the Leviathan 
platform. Afterwards, they changed their course once more to proceed to Haifa (one of 
these incidents is depicted in Figure 10). 
 
Figure 9. Location of Tamar and Leviathan platforms236 
 
234 This website displays the position of ships from data transmitted by their AIS (Automatic 
Identification System). As small pleasure or fishing vessels are not obliged to transmit their position on 
AIS, these vessels are not displayed in the website’s maps. Navy ships are also exempt from the obligation 
to transmit their position, regardless of size. 
235 The traffic density depicted is from 2017, which is, importantly, before the installation of the 
Leviathan Production Platform, as this is the latest data available at Marinetraffic.com. Even if the Covid-
19 pandemic had resulted in a decrease of maritime traffic off the coast of Israel, the comparison of the 
traffic of the route Ashkelon—Haifa to the routes open sea—Haifa, open sea—Ashkelon, and Turkish ports 
Mersina or Iskenderun to Port Said and Damietta evidenced that the route Ashkelon—Haifa has 
considerably less traffic than the other routes. 
236 Adapted screenshot from the website Marinetraffic.com. 
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(1) Course: 012° – CPA: 2.2 NM / (2) Course: 002° – CPA: 4.7 NM / (3) Difference between initial 
track and actual track / (4) Course: 022° to approach Haifa  
Figure 10. Merchant vessel course alteration to open distance from the 
Leviathan Production Platform as it transits from Ashkelon to Haifa237 
As merchant vessels always take the shortest route and do not deviate from their 
course except to avoid collision or during an emergency, this change of course indicates 
that the vessel was probably instructed by Israeli authorities to increase the distance of the 
closest point of approach (CPA) to the offshore platform to at least 8.7 kilometers (4.7 
nautical miles). By keeping this distance, the time it would take to purposely ram a 
merchant vessel into the platform increases, along with the available time to neutralize that 
threat. Moreover, at this distance, the offshore platform remains outside the range of 
commonly used weapons in terrorist attacks, like rocket-propelled grenades, short-range 
anti-tank missiles, or rifles.  
Despite these measures, small pleasure and fishing vessels pose additional security 
concerns. Although merchant vessels are prevented from approaching close to the offshore 
 
237 Adapted screenshots from the website Marinetraffic.com. 
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platforms, during the same period (April 2020), a sailing vessel was observed approaching 
as close as 2.8 kilometers (1.5 nautical miles) to the Leviathan Production Platform (Figure 
11). At that range, many of the above-mentioned weapons can be used to conduct an attack 
against the platform. Additionally, as the position of many small pleasure and fishing 
vessels is not displayed by the website Marinetraffic.com, the approach of these types of 
vessels close to the offshore natural gas platforms could be more frequent and only be 
observed visually or by radar. However, although the position of Israeli Navy ships does 
not appear in the screenshots, it is possible and very likely that a patrol boat was in the 
vicinity, ready to act against the sailing vessel if it tried to conduct an attack.  
 
Figure 11. Approach of a sailing boat to Leviathan Production Platform238 
The offshore platforms themselves take additional security measures to defend 
themselves against attacks. No information regarding these security measures is publicly 
available. However, according to a press release by Israeli company DSIT Solutions, the 
 
238 Adapted screenshot from the website Marinetraffic.com. 
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Karish-Tanin FPSO vessel will be equipped with an autonomous and automatic underwater 
diver detection sonar system.239 These systems are used to detect divers and unmanned 
underwater vehicles which approach the facility they are installed on, in order to alert 
security forces. It is very likely that the Tamar and Leviathan production platforms are also 
equipped with such a system or will be equipped with one in the near future.  
Finally, all these defenses are tested by conducting naval exercises, evaluated, and, 
subsequently, improved. Reports on these exercises indicate that Israel is practicing all 
possible scenarios, including retaking an offshore platform that was hijacked by 
terrorists,240 UAV attacks, rocket attacks, submarine attacks, and surface vessel attacks.241 
Lessons learned from other operations are also taken into consideration. For example, on 
October 6, 2019, Israel investigated the attack on the Abqaiq facilities in Saudi Arabia, in 
order to reevaluate its own defenses and plan the required upgrades.242 
In sum, although the number and type of the units that protect the offshore platforms 
at any time are unknown, some educated guesses can be made. The area close to the 
platforms is definitely under constant surveillance. All ships and aircraft in the vicinity are 
monitored, identified, and assessed as potential hostile targets. A number of small, fast, 
and lightly armed boats, manned or unmanned, are likely patrolling close to the platforms 
in order to intercept any vessel that deviates from its course and approaches the platforms. 
Maritime patrol aircraft, helicopters, or UAVs could provide further assistance. One or 
more bigger warships—either Saar 4.5 missile boats or Saar 5 corvettes, armed with more 
powerful weapons like guns and anti-ship missiles—also likely patrol close to the 
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platforms, ready to engage bigger hijacked merchant vessels, which could try to ram the 
platforms or approach to launch an attack. The missile boats and corvettes can also engage 
incoming missiles, rockets, or UAVs and detect and destroy submarines or small 
submersibles. The offshore platform diver detection systems also help neutralize any 
threats from divers or small unmanned underwater vehicles. 
These measures appear to be sufficient to counter any of the assault scenarios 
described in Chapter III, to prevent a large merchant vessel from ramming the platforms, 
and to destroy incoming rockets, missiles, and UAVs. However, the platforms are protected 
by a finite number of Iron Dome interceptors, and the Iron Dome and C-Dome systems do 
not have a 100% interception rate. If the number of incoming threats to the platforms 
increases, the number of threats that go through the defenses will also increase. This means 
that a small number of these rockets, missiles, or drones would not be destroyed and, if 
their accuracy systems and their reliability are good enough, they could hit a platform. If 
the number of rockets, missiles, or UAVs used for the attack is larger than the number of 
available Iron Dome interceptors, a small number of rockets, missiles, or UAVs will 
initially penetrate the defenses and, after the interceptors have been depleted, all remaining 
rockets, missiles, and UAVs will fly towards their target unopposed. As mentioned in 
Chapter III, offshore natural gas platforms are vulnerable to accidents and, even more so, 
attacks. Even one rocket, missile, or UAV can destroy an offshore natural gas platform if 
it detonates a sufficient explosive charge in the right place.  
B. CONFRONTATION PREVENTION AND DETERRENCE 
Given that no defensive system, even the most advanced, is completely reliable and 
impregnable, not having to repel an attack is a much safer option for the safety of the 
offshore gas platforms than having to defend against one, so Israel is intent on preventing 
its enemies from attacking its offshore natural gas platforms in the first place. The two 
methods Israel uses to prevent attacks from occurring are: weakening enemy forces, thus 
denying the enemy the opportunity to acquire and deploy the required military equipment 
to overcome Israel’s defenses; and deterring the enemy from attacking by demonstrating 
82 
the effectiveness of Israel’s defenses and informing the enemy that any attack would result 
in harsh punishment for the perpetrator and any collaborators.  
1. Weakening the Enemy 
In order to keep the offensive capabilities of its enemies in check, Israel’s doctrine 
entails the execution of a “campaign between wars” (CBW).243 Israel uses intelligence 
reports to conduct proactive strikes against its enemies. With this strategy, Israel tries to 
weaken or at least prevent the strengthening of its enemies and thus create more favorable 
conditions for Israel in a future war. For example, Israel is trying to prevent Hezbollah and 
the IRGC from using Syria or Lebanon as bases from which they could launch high-
accuracy rockets and missiles.244 Regarding Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), 
Israel’s concerns and efforts are focused on preventing them from acquiring higher-
accuracy rockets. As stated in the previous chapter, most rockets that Hezbollah, Hamas, 
and PIJ possess lack the required accuracy to pose a credible threat to Israeli offshore gas 
platforms, even if the platforms are unprotected. However, Iran is assisting Hezbollah in 
upgrading the accuracy of its rocket arsenal, which could make them a more urgent 
threat.245 The upgrade of the rockets was scheduled to be performed in factories in 
Lebanon and Syria. Israel has reportedly compelled Hezbollah to cease production of these 
high-precision rockets, either by pressuring the Lebanese government and Hezbollah or by 
bombing the factories in Syria.246 As a result, the Israelis estimate that Hezbollah possesses 
only a few dozen high-precision rockets,247 while the overwhelming majority of its rockets 
are inaccurate. 
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2. Deterring Attacks 
Israel is also preventing attacks on offshore platforms by demonstrating the Israeli 
Defense Forces’ (IDF) readiness and ability to defend them while signaling that an attack 
on the offshore platforms would trigger devastating consequences. Distinguished political 
scientist Kenneth Waltz defines the two methods that a state can use to prevent another 
state from attacking.248 The first method, which he calls the defensive ideal, is for a state 
to build such strong defenses that attacking it appears futile. As the potential perpetrator, 
state or non-state, understands that any attack would fail, it refrains from even trying. The 
second method is to make sure that the would-be attacker understands that, if it attacks, it 
will receive unacceptably severe punishment. Therefore, the attack will not be conducted 
not because it would fail but because the state is afraid of the consequences. This is the 
definition of deterrence.249  
In order to display Israel’s capabilities to defend its offshore platforms and dissuade 
its enemies from conducting attacks, Israel’s completion of naval exercises for offshore 
platform defense is frequently reported by Israeli news websites, which offer details about 
the exercise scenarios, interviews with senior Israeli Navy officers, photographs (Figure 
12), and videos.250 In addition to reassuring Israeli citizens, these announcements inform 
potential attackers about the preparedness of the IDF to counter attacks on the offshore 
platforms. So do published reports on IDF procurement programs or upgrades of military 
systems, like a report about the installation of a C-Dome system on board INS Lahav.251  
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Figure 12. An Israeli Sa’ar 5 (INS Lahav) corvette sailing close to an offshore 
natural gas production platform252 
Israel has also demonstrated readiness to retaliate against its enemies by conducting 
high-accuracy, devastating attacks on important targets when it deems necessary. For 
example, Israel has conducted numerous airstrikes in Syria, many of which targeted Iran’s 
military infrastructure.253 Israel also signaled its willingness to strike back against attacks 
in 2008, when then-Chief of Northern Command Gadi Eisenkot introduced the “Dahiyah 
doctrine.”254 Eisenkot stated, without leaving any room for misunderstanding, that Israel 
would henceforth consider any village from which Israel was attacked as an enemy military 
base and attack it with disproportionate force.255  
Other acts that demonstrated Israeli readiness and deterrence included a statement 
by Defense Minister Ehud Barak in 2009 that the Lebanese government would be held 
accountable for any attacks on Israel by Hezbollah256 and the Israeli policy that Hamas 
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would be considered complicit in any attacks that originated in Gaza, as it should exert 
total control in the territory it rules.257 This strategy has succeeded. As Amos Yadlin, a 
former chief of Israeli Military Intelligence, stated, “Vis-a-vis Hamas and Hezbollah, we 
haven’t destroyed their capabilities, but we were able to establish deterrence. This is 
basically because we hit them hard, and because the terrorists, in a way, became non-full-
state-entities, but half-state entities…The terrorists have discovered that when they are 
responsible for their economy, for education, for the life of their people, suddenly they are 
not daring to use terror all day.”258 Hezbollah and Hamas can indeed be deterred more 
easily, as they both have a political party and political responsibilities in Lebanon and Gaza 
Strip, respectively (see Chapter IV).  
Deterring PIJ and the IRGC is, however, more challenging. Israel is trying to 
prevent PIJ from conducting attacks by stating that it will hold Hamas responsible for any 
attack that originates from the Gaza Strip.259 As Hamas rules over the Gaza Strip, Israel 
asserts that it should police the area. Any attack from Gaza would either indicate that 
Hamas cannot effectively rule or that it supports the attack. As a result of this policy, Hamas 
is forced to try to constrain PIJ’s attacks in order to prevent Israel from retaliating against 
both Hamas and PIJ targets in Gaza. Nevertheless, Israel’s policy is not very successful, as 
sometimes PIJ continues to launch attacks in spite of Hamas’s efforts,260 and other times 
Hamas chooses to cooperate with PIJ against Israel.261  
As the IRGC is an official branch of the armed forces of Iran, the methods that 
Israel uses to deter it from conducting attacks are more complicated. On the one hand, 
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Israel makes public statements that any attacks by Iran on Israel would draw retaliation. 
Such declarations were made shortly after the Abqaiq oil facilities attack in September 
2019,262 and after the Iranian attack on the Iraqi airbases where U.S. military personnel 
were stationed in January 2020.263 In addition, Israel demonstrates its resolve to act by 
conducting attacks against Iranian targets in Syria when it deems such attacks 
necessary.264 As Israel has also invested significant resources to build up capabilities to be 
able to strike targets inside Iran, and especially Iran’s nuclear facilities,265 this combination 
of statements and actions could deter Iran and, therefore, the IRGC from conducting attacks 
against the Israeli offshore natural gas platforms.   
Israel has yet to formally declare what its reaction would be if its offshore natural 
gas platforms were attacked. The only available statement by an official was made online 
by Israeli Minister of Energy Yuval Steinitz in February 2018, after Hezbollah threatened 
to attack Israeli offshore platforms in the context of the Israel–Lebanon EEZ delimitation 
dispute. Steinitz stated that just the act of conducting an attack on the offshore platforms, 
even if it were to fail, would result in Israel declaring war on both Lebanon and Syria, as 
both countries closely cooperate with Hezbollah. He added that “Israel would start a battle, 
if necessary, to prevent Syria from becoming an Iranian base that arms Hezbollah with 
precision rockets.”266 It is therefore highly likely that an attack on Israeli offshore natural 
gas platforms would result in strong retaliation from Israel. This would be the case not only 
for Hezbollah but for any other perpetrator of such an attack.  
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Finally, Israel uses intelligence to increase the credibility of its deterrence. As Israel 
has reached a point of mutual deterrence with Hezbollah,267 it is reluctant to conduct air 
strikes in Lebanon. Therefore, since 2010, Israel has chosen to disclose select information 
about Hezbollah’s facilities in Lebanon. In two cases, Israel publicized information about 
the location of Hezbollah’s facilities in Lebanese villages, to let Hezbollah know that it 
could be attacked at any time. While Hezbollah was warned and could then relocate its 
facilities, this disclosure made clear that Hezbollah would be punished if it attacked 
Israel.268 Another such incident occurred in 2018, when IDF exposed that rockets were 
being upgraded in several locations in Beirut. The statement put pressure on the Lebanese 
government, as it was allegedly allowing Hezbollah to conduct these upgrades. According 
to Prime Minister Netanyahu, three months after the statement, the facilities were shut 
down.269 As Hezbollah’s program of high-accuracy rockets is disturbed, its capabilities to 
threaten the security of Israeli offshore natural gas platforms remain low. 
The fact that there has only been one attack against offshore natural gas platforms 
with only two unguided rockets fired at them (see Chapter IV), illustrates that Israel has so 
far successfully prevented Hamas, PIJ, Hezbollah, and Iran from attacking its offshore 
platforms. The defenses of the platforms are likely to be augmented in the future, especially 
after the commissioning of the Saar 6 corvettes. As long as Israel prevents the deployment 
of large numbers of high-accuracy rockets, missiles, and UAVs within striking distance 
from its offshore platforms and continues to retaliate against other attacks that these 
organizations conduct against Israel, it is likely that no further attacks on the offshore 
platforms will occur, or, if they do, they will be of low intensity and risk, like the attack 
Hamas conducted in 2014. 
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C. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter examined Israel’s response to the threats that its offshore natural gas 
platforms face. It produced three key findings. First, even if the defensive measures that 
protect the offshore gas platforms are not fully known, it appears that they would be 
sufficient to counter any existing and known potential attack, except a saturation attack by 
a large number of rockets, missiles, or UAVs. Even then, however, the result of the attack 
would depend on the reliability and accuracy of these systems. Second, Israel uses its 
intelligence capabilities to obtain critical information that it uses to attack important 
facilities and limit the threat posed by its enemies to offshore platforms. Finally, since there 
has only been one ineffective attack against offshore natural gas platforms, which was more 
symbolic than intended to cause damage, Israel is successfully preventing Hamas, PIJ, 




As analyzed in Chapter III, offshore gas platforms are physically vulnerable to 
attacks. The platforms are large, rigid structures, but gas pipes can be fractured as a result 
of an attack, causing a gas leakage and, subsequently, if a spark or fire is present, an 
explosion. The effectiveness of an attack depends on which part of the platform is struck 
and with what weapon. The platforms would be more vulnerable to rocket, missile, or drone 
attacks, since these weapons either have larger payloads (rockets and missiles) or can target 
specific, vulnerable systems of the platforms with high accuracy (drones). A barrage of 
rockets, missiles, drones, or some combination could overwhelm even the best anti-air 
defenses, including Iron Dome. An attack by ramming a large ship could also be successful 
in destroying an offshore gas platform, as, in addition to causing a gas leakage and 
explosion,  the impact of the ship could cause the sinking of the platform. 
However, even though the threats posed by state and non-state actors to the Israeli 
offshore gas platforms, presented in Chapter IV, are severe, the risk of a damaging attack 
is low. Two of the examined terrorist organizations, Hezbollah and the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), have incentives to attack Israel and the required 
capabilities to plan and conduct attacks against Israel’s platforms. However, they have low 
chances of success. The other two organizations, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad 
(PIJ), have incentives to attack Israel and in fact conduct frequent attacks against other 
targets in Israel, but do not currently possess the capabilities to effectively attack the 
platforms. However, commercially available technological developments and Iranian 
support could change this situation.  
The fact that only one attack, which was more symbolic than intended to succeed, 
has been conducted against Israel’s offshore gas platforms (see Chapter IV) supports the 
argument that, currently, the risk of an attack on them by Israel’s adversaries is low. This 
contradiction—severe threats but low risk of an attack occurring—raises the questions of 
why more attacks against these platforms have not been conducted and, more important, 
how likely it is that such attacks will occur in the future and, if attacks could occur in the 
future, how severe their impacts will be.  
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A. WHY ISRAEL’S ENEMIES HAVE NOT CONDUCTED MORE ATTACKS 
ON ITS OFFSHORE GAS PLATFORMS 
Considering the importance of the Israeli offshore gas platforms, analyzed in 
Chapter II, and the fact that Hamas and PIJ frequently conduct attacks against targets in 
Israel, as well as the hostility between Israel and Hezbollah and Iran, one could reasonably 
expect that Israel’s offshore gas platforms would be attacked more frequently. As stated in 
Chapter I, there are multiple interconnected variables that contribute to the lack of attacks 
against Israeli offshore platforms, listed as follows. 
1. Israeli Deterrence 
One of the most compelling variables that contribute to the lack of attacks on the 
Israeli offshore gas platforms, analyzed in Chapter V, is that Israel dissuades terrorists from 
attacking by building up and publicly demonstrating the platforms’ defenses. As the area 
around the platforms is closely monitored and a multi-layered and effective defense system 
is in place, potential perpetrators recognize the difficulty of conducting a successful attack 
on the platforms and are likely to refrain from attacking, preferring more accessible targets. 
Additionally, Israel successfully deters the terrorist organizations by declaring that 
it will retaliate against anyone who conducts attacks against critical targets. This retaliation 
would not be limited to the perpetrator of the attack but would include the authorities of 
the region where the attack originated. Depending on the perpetrator, Israel would likely 
invade either Lebanon or the Gaza Strip to conduct a land campaign. The deterrence gains 
credibility as Israel does not hesitate to frequently conduct airstrikes in Syria and Gaza, 
against all its enemies, including the IRGC. 
2. Limited Group Capabilities 
Another reason for the lack of attacks on the Israeli offshore gas platforms is that, 
while Israel’s enemies may be willing to conduct attacks against the platforms, either they 
do not currently have the required capabilities or they are engaged in other operations. As 
described in Chapter IV, the two organizations with the capabilities to attack the offshore 
gas platforms, Hezbollah and IRGC, are currently engaged in other operations, mostly in 
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Syria and, to a lesser degree, in Yemen. The other two organizations, Hamas and PIJ, lack 
the necessary capabilities.  
Even though Hezbollah and the IRGC are large organizations with considerable 
arsenals of rockets, missiles, and UAVs, they may still lack the capabilities to successfully 
attack Israel’s offshore gas platforms. In order for an attack to succeed, the perpetrators 
would have to reach the platforms with enough firepower to achieve their goals. For a 
rocket, missile, or UAV attack, that would mean that the platforms are within range of the 
launching sites and that the defensive measures would be unable to destroy all incoming 
threats. For an assault, success would mean that a group of assailants strong enough to 
destroy the platform could penetrate the defenses (see Chapter III). As Israel’s defenses 
may still thwart these attacks, Hezbollah and the IRGC may feel that they do not yet have 
the necessary capabilities to be confident that attacks on the Israeli offshore gas platforms 
would be successful, explaining further the lack of attacks on the Israeli platforms. 
3. Group Incentives to Attack the Israeli Offshore Gas Platforms 
Another major variable contributing to the lack of attacks is the limited will of 
Israel’s adversaries to conduct attacks against the offshore platforms. Evidence presented 
mostly in Chapter IV suggests that Hamas is willing to attack the platforms, as it already 
has conducted such an attack. Hezbollah also threatens to conduct attacks if Israel tries to 
exploit natural gas from the area that Lebanon considers its exclusive economic zone 
(EEZ). PIJ and IRGC, on the other hand, have not even threatened to attack the Israeli 
offshore gas platforms.  
However, it is likely that none of these adversaries considers attacking Israel’s 
offshore platforms a priority, which can explain the lack of attacks. The fact that Hamas 
attacked only once and with only two unguided rockets, in addition to Hezbollah stating 
that it would only attack the Israeli offshore gas platforms if Israel attacked first, supports 
this assessment. Other research has shown that terrorist organizations in general use target 
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selection processes to evaluate potential targets before deciding which one to attack.270 As 
terrorist organizations generally have limited resources, they usually cannot afford to 
conduct unsuccessful attacks. An unsuccessful attack not only wastes valuable resources, 
both human and material, but it also provides an opportunity for the Israeli government to 
appear strong and effective, gaining public support, while at the same time incurring the 
opposite effects for the perpetrator.271 Therefore, terrorists tend to conduct attacks against 
targets that they are certain they can destroy.272 As the defenses protecting the Israeli 
offshore gas platforms are substantial, none of Israel’s enemies may realistically presume 
that an attack on the platforms would have a 100% chance of success.  
4. Popular and International Opposition 
A final explanation for why Israel’s enemies have not attacked its offshore gas 
platforms is that they fear the backlash among their supporters and international public 
opinion. Targeting errors and the subsequent backlash is one reason that a terrorist group 
can implode.273 As an effective attack on the platforms could result in a large number of 
casualties and excessive pollution, justifying it to the group’s supporters and the global 
community could prove challenging. Israelis and the international community would likely 
condemn such an attack. In addition, if the attack caused many casualties, excessive 
pollution, and power outages, a part of the Arab population in Israel might become 
disillusioned with the perpetrator group.  
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B. PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE ATTACKS ON ISRAELI OFFSHORE GAS 
PLATFORMS 
1. Likelihood of Future Attacks  
Due to a combination of factors, no enemy of Israel is currently willing to conduct 
attacks against Israel’s offshore gas platforms. Therefore, even though the threats exist, the 
risk of well-organized and forceful attacks on Israeli offshore gas platforms seems to be 
low. This assessment is based on the current situation. A significant event that generated a 
change in the policy of Israel or any of its enemies could potentially lead to deterrence 
failure, either because Israel’s threat of retaliation is no longer credible or because the state 
or non-state actor no longer cares about Israeli retaliation. Such changes could include a 
new Israeli government that appears more appeasing to the terrorist organizations (loss of 
deterrence credibility), the assassination of the leader of one of the terrorist organizations 
by Israel, the annexation of parts of the West Bank by Israel, or an outbreak of war between 
Israel and Hezbollah, Hamas, PIJ, or especially Iran (loss of deterrent effect), making an 
attack on an Israeli offshore gas platform more likely.  
Even if Israel’s enemies acquire more effective weapon systems that could be used 
to attack the offshore gas platforms in the future, such attacks would not become more 
likely. As long as Israel vows to retaliate harshly against the perpetrators of any attacks on 
its offshore platforms, the platforms will not be considered priority targets, as the costs of 
the retaliation would be unacceptable for the perpetrator. Additionally, as Israel will 
probably keep upgrading the defenses of the offshore platforms, the possibility of 
successfully attacking the platforms may not increase substantially, even if the groups’ 
capabilities increase.  
None of the adversaries examined in this thesis would rationally choose to attack 
Israel’s offshore gas platforms. However, importantly, terrorists may act irrationally, make 
emotional decisions, or misjudge the situation, especially if they operate under extreme 
pressure and isolation from the rest of the world,274 so an attack on the Israeli offshore gas 
platforms could still be conducted. 
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2. Consequences of Attacks  
However small the probability of an attack on the Israeli offshore gas platforms 
may be, an attack on them would have the following severe economic, geopolitical, and 
environmental consequences:  
a. Economic 
The destruction of one or more Israeli offshore platforms would have severe 
economic consequences for Israel. The overall consequences are hard to predict. Israel may 
lose its few natural gas export customers (Egypt and Jordan), as these states would probably 
switch to more secure providers. The production on the remaining operating production 
platforms may be reduced or even stopped, due to security concerns. The international 
companies which have invested in the natural gas infrastructure may opt out. Insurance 
costs for the offshore natural gas platforms in Israel would skyrocket. Finally, recruiting 
employees for these platforms would become much more difficult. If either the Leviathan 
or the Tamar production platforms is disabled or destroyed, natural gas production could 
be instantly decreased by as much as 50%. As Israel’s production of natural gas was more 
than double its 2017 domestic consumption, this shortfall of production might not lead to 
severe natural gas shortages in the Israeli market. If required, Israel can also import natural 
gas through the Hadera LNG terminal or the pipeline that is used to export Israeli natural 
gas to Egyp, although reversal of flow would be required for the latter.  
Returning to previous natural gas production levels would be a significant challenge 
and would take years. Repair of a damaged production platform would probably take 
months or years to complete. A complete destruction of a production platform would be 
worse: for example, the Leviathan Production Platform took twenty-six months to build,275 
and then more time to be transported from the U.S. to Israel and set to work. 
Internationally, the consequences may vary depending on whether any Israeli 
natural gas would still be available for export and, more important, on whether war would 
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break out between Israel and one or more of its enemies. If Israel’s retaliation is 
constrained, global oil and gas prices are likely to increase slightly, if not remain stable. In 
case other nations threaten to attack Israel or join the war against Israel, insecurity over the 
stability in the entire Middle East region could cause prices to increase significantly. As 
Israel’s natural gas production is very small, compared to the top natural gas producers, the 
decrease of the natural gas production caused by the attack will not by itself impact global 
natural gas prices. At a regional level, the effect of Israel’s reduced natural gas production 
would likely be small. Egypt might face a small short-term shortage, as it imported 12% of 
the natural gas it consumed in 2017, while Jordan might face more important shortages,276 
which could, however, be overcome by importing natural gas from other sources.  
b. Geopolitical 
Importantly, an attack on Israeli offshore natural gas platforms has the potential to 
lead to an outbreak of war between Israel and the perpetrator group and the sponsoring 
nation (i.e., Lebanon and/or Iran). This war could escalate into a regional war, as anti-Israel 
sentiments would peak. Other Muslim nations might provide assistance to Israel’s enemies 
depending on who is fighting against Israel. A war against Hamas or PIJ in Gaza could 
prompt Sunni Muslim nations, like Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab 
Emirates, to intervene, while a war against Hezbollah or Iran would probably not result in 
other nations joining the war. 
A crippling blow to Israel’s natural gas production would not only damage Israel’s 
energy security; it would also nullify all the geopolitical benefits which were analyzed in 
Chapter II. Israel could potentially lose the prominent role in the international community 
and the leading role in energy developments in the region it currently enjoys, being once 
more labeled by its enemies as the oppressor. 
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An attack on an Israeli offshore gas platform could cause significant environmental 
problems. Condensate would spill in the sea and, given the proximity of the Tamar and, 
even more, Leviathan production platforms to the coast, the pollution would reach the 
shore. This pollution could affect the desalination plants that operate at the coast close to 
the platforms, as well as tourism in Israel. 
C. SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS, AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
1. Summary and Implications 
Offshore natural gas platforms constitute critical infrastructure for Israel. Their 
importance is not only economic but also geopolitical and environmental. The design and 
operation of the platforms entail dangers, which are greatly exacerbated by the threat of 
any terrorist or military attack on the platforms. 
As Israel is facing significant security challenges from terrorist organizations and 
Iran, the possibility of an attack against its offshore gas platforms has to be seriously 
considered. Hezbollah and the IRGC can already conduct attacks by using rockets, 
missiles, or UAVs, while Hamas and PIJ currently seem unable to conduct effective 
attacks. The threat to the security of the offshore platforms is clear and present. Israel has 
built up strong defenses to protect its offshore gas platforms. The delivery of the four Saar 
6 corvettes in the near future will further enhance these defenses.  
Due to a combination of factors, it currently appears that no terrorist organization 
is willing to conduct attacks against Israel’s offshore gas platforms. Therefore, although 
the threats exist, the risk of well-organized and forceful attacks on Israeli offshore gas 
platforms is low.  
Israel’s offshore gas platforms’ security is a unique case study: no other country in 
the world is facing a combined threat to its offshore gas or oil platforms by terrorist 
organizations—equipped, no less, with advanced rockets, missiles, and UAVs—and states. 
At the same time, some countries face significant, yet less advanced terrorist threats; 
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Nigeria is the most notable example. Others face threats from states: most notably Cyprus 
and countries in the South China Sea. 
These countries may learn three main lessons from the Israeli approach to offshore 
platform security. First, installing undersea production wells and placing the production 
platforms close to the shore, where the production platform can be protected more 
effectively by defensive systems, practically eliminates any threats in areas distant from 
the shore. Furthermore, if the production platform is inside its territorial sea, the state has 
more legal leeway to declare and enforce whatever security zones it deems necessary. 
However, these advantages have to be weighed against the environmental risk of having 
the offshore platform close to the shore. Second, depending on the strategic importance of 
the retrievable reserves, the states should invest in developing or purchasing effective 
defensive systems to counter any conceivable threat to the platforms. Finally, deterrence is 
paramount. Even the best weapon systems cannot protect the platforms if the state is not 
prepared to use them. Every potential perpetrator has to be informed that an attack on the 
platforms would likely fail and, more important, would be severely punished. In Israel’s 
case, it would seem that, even though its adversaries appreciate the importance of the 
offshore gas platforms to Israel, they choose not to conduct attacks on them because of the 
unacceptable costs of the expected retaliation.  
2. Further Research 
Given the low probability of a successful attack on the Israeli offshore gas platforms 
and the negative effects such an attack would have on the perpetrator, it is not likely that 
the examined adversaries of Israel would choose to attack the platforms. However, a 
comparative approach examining the attractiveness of Israeli offshore gas platforms as 
targets compared to other high-profile targets in Israel could provide a rough estimate of 
whether the terrorist organizations would prioritize attacking the offshore platforms. This 
comparison, which could use Shemella’s CARVES (criticality, accessibility, resilience, 
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vulnerability, effects, symbolism) method,277 requires a very detailed analysis, which is 
beyond the scope of this thesis.  
Due to time and space limitations, this thesis did not consider the cybersecurity of 
the Israeli offshore gas platforms. Further research could examine the cyber threats that 
state or non-state actors pose to the offshore platforms. Additionally, other subjects that 
could complement this thesis would be a more tactical-naval approach to the defense of the 
platforms, which would, however, require access to classified information from the Israeli 
Ministry of Defense.  
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